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ABSTRACT
Modeling Risks in Infrastructure Asset Management. (August 2011)
Seyed Reza Seyedolshohadaie, B.S., Iran University of Science and Technology;
M.S., Prairie View A&M University
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sergiy I. Butenko
Dr. Ivan Damnjanovic
The goal of this dissertation research was to model risk in delivery, operation
and maintenance phases of infrastructure asset management. More specifically, the
two main objectives of this research were to quantify and measure financial risk in
privatizing and operational risks in maintenance and rehabilitation of infrastructure
facilities. To this end, a valuation procedure for valuing large-scale risky projects is
proposed. This valuation approach is based on mean-risk portfolio optimization in
which a risk-averse decision-maker seeks to maximize the expected return subject to
downside risk. We showed that, in complete markets, the value obtained from this
approach is equal to the value obtained from the standard option pricing approach.
Furthermore, we introduced Coherent Valuation Procedure (CVP) for valuing risky
projects in partially complete markets. This approach leads to a lower degree of
subjectivity as it only requires one parameter to incorporate user’s risk preferences.
Compared to the traditional discounted cash flow analysis, CVP displays a reasonable
degree of sensitivity to the discount rate, since only the risk-free rate is used to dis-
count future cash flows. The application of this procedure on valuing a transportation
iv
public-private partnership is presented.
Secondly, a risk-based framework for prescribing optimal risk-based maintenance
and rehabilitation (M&R) policies for transportation infrastructure is presented. These
policies guarantee a certain performance level across the network under a predefined
level of risk. The long-term model is formulated in the Markov Decision Process
framework with risk-averse actions and transitional probabilities describing the un-
certainty in the deterioration process. Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is used as
the measure of risk. The steady-state risk-averse M&R policies are modeled assum-
ing no budget restriction. To address the short-term resource allocation problem,
two linear programming models are presented to generate network-level polices with
different objectives. In the first model, decision-maker minimizes the total risk across
the network, and in the second model, the highest risk to the network performance
is minimized.
vTo life
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Availability of civil infrastructure systems such as transportation, power, water and
communications is the driving force behind the economic development of any region.
Infrastructure has a direct effect on the quality of life and overall well being of the
society. The massive networks of civil infrastructure systems built to support and
maintain the economic growth in countries around the world are the result of decades
of planning and development, making them the largest asset in public ownership.
Developing and maintaining infrastructure networks requires a long-term plan and
allocation of a significant amount of resources.
Public, semi-public or private agencies are responsible for building, maintaining
or improving infrastructure systems in a sustainable and effective way. In this effort,
infrastructure asset management models are used to incorporate an economic assess-
ment of trade-offs among alternative investments for construction, maintenance and
rehabilitation of such facilities. By using these models, a network of infrastructure
facilities can be managed in a cost-effective, efficient and reliable manner. In many
countries around the world, infrastructure systems are built and maintained by fed-
eral, state and local governments, however, there is an interest in attracting private
funding to develop or maintain infrastructure facilities.
In the United States (U.S.), infrastructure systems have traditionally been owned
and operated by government agencies. However, as the result of tax reduction in re-
cent decades, a lower level of funding is available for infrastructure spending. The
This dissertation follows the style of Mathematical Programming Journal.
2unavailability of resources in underfunded agencies responsible for maintaining in-
frastructure facilities often results in deferred maintenance on facilities that must
undergo periodic maintenance to maximize their service lives. Infrastructure facil-
ities deteriorate more rapidly due to the lack of proper maintenance and they will
become exposed to the risk of severe structural damages. Consequently, the overall
cost of maintenance increases significantly as more expensive actions will be required
to restore these facilities to acceptable condition levels.
Transportation infrastructure systems, in particular, are more visible to users
and their deficiencies have apparent impact on society. According to the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation, in the U.S., 74% percent of the $8.4 trillion worth of
commodities is transported by trucks on interstate highways. Despite the massive
network of highways, the cost of traffic congestion in terms of loss of productivity
and fuel costs in the U.S. has been estimated to be $115 billion in 2010, causing,
on average, every urban resident to spend an extra 34 hours of travel time and use
28 gallons of fuel [55]. In 2000, the total expenditure by all levels of government on
transportation infrastructure was $64.6 billion. However, the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration (FHWA) estimates that the spending by all levels of government would
have to increase by 17.5% to reach its projected $75.9 billion needed to maintain the
current condition levels, and by 65.3% to reach $106.9 billion needed to improve the
conditions of roads and highways [3].
B. Goals and Objectives
The goal of this dissertation research is to model risk in delivery, operation and
maintenance phases of infrastructure asset management. More specifically, the two
objectives of this dissertation are:
31. Develop a valuation approach for large-scale engineering projects.
2. Develop a framework for risk-based maintenance and rehabilitation of trans-
portation infrastructure.
A natural way to increase funding for infrastructure spending for construction
of new and maintenance of the existing facilities is by attracting private investment
for such projects. Many states in the U.S. have enacted legislation that allows pri-
vate sector investment in infrastructure projects through Public-Private Partnerships
(PPPs). PPPs are contractual agreements in which the private sector gets involved
in part, or in the entire, process of designing, financing, constructing and operating
public infrastructure facilities [7].
An important part of privatizing infrastructure assets is project valuation as both
parties embark on quantifying the risks and finding the value of investment. Similar
to any other risky assets, the value of an infrastructure project is proportional to its
underlying risks and prospective return. Infrastructure projects are usually capital
intensive and require significant investment, but at the same time they cannot be
traded in open markets. The large-scale and non-traded nature of infrastructure
projects require special consideration in valuing such assets. One of the challenges
arising in the valuing risky assets stems from uncertainties that are unique to the
project. The first objective is to develop a valuation procedure for valuing large-scale
engineering projects.
The second objective is aimed at identifying and measuring risk stemming from
the uncertain deterioration of transportation infrastructure facilities. The goal is
to develop a risk-based framework for prescribing long-and short- term resource al-
location decisions for maintenance or rehabilitation of a network of transportation
infrastructure facilities.
4Transportation infrastructure is being used for demonstrating the models devel-
oped in this dissertation research since, traditionally, transportation infrastructure
has been used for proof of concept, however, these models can be implemented on
other classes of infrastructure.
C. Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II provides background and defi-
nitions. Chapter III, discusses risk in general, the concept of risk management and
ways to quantify risk from a perspective of a risk-averse decision-maker. Chapter IV
presents a procedure for valuing large-scale engineering projects. Chapter V presents
a framework for risk-based maintenance and rehabilitation of a network of trans-
portation infrastructure facilities. The summary of findings, conclusions and future
research directions are discussed in Chapter VI.
5CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
A. Infrastructure Asset Management
Several definitions for infrastructure asset management have been proposed. Accord-
ing to FHWA [5],
“Asset management is a business process and a decision-making frame-
work that covers an extended time horizon, draws from economics as well
as engineering, and considers a broad range of assets. The asset manage-
ment approach incorporates the economic assessment of trade-offs among
alternative investment options and uses this information to help make
cost-effective investment decisions.”
According to the Organization for European Cooperation and Development Working
Group [63],
“Asset management goes beyond the traditional management practice of
examining singular systems within road networks; i.e., pavements, bridges,
etc.; and looks at the universal system of a network of roads and all of its
components to allow comprehensive management of limited resources.”
In the broadest sense, infrastructure management spans all stages of infrastruc-
ture life cycle: planning, programming, budgeting, design, construction, and opera-
tion and maintenance [27]. The objective of asset management is to build and operate
infrastructure facilities in the most reliable, cost effective and sustainable way.
Infrastructure management can also be viewed from two managerial levels: net-
work and project [6, 47]. At the network level, agencies manage all elements of a
6single infrastructure facility or a network of facilities. In some cases, this may involve
grouping facilities together to form distinct subsets. The purpose of the network-level
management process is normally related to planning, programming, and determining
funding levels, prioritizing needs and analyzing the impact of various funding sce-
narios on the future condition of the infrastructure system and the overall welfare
of the community. One of the challenges in this process is measuring the benefits of
alternative actions. The benefits of a public project are not easy to quantify due to
the distributed nature of the benefits and also non-uniform utility function of differ-
ent components of infrastructure users. In addition, unlike the private sector, public
agencies are not-for-profit organizations.
At a project level, however, only a single facility or a portion of a facility that
in some cases corresponds to an original construction project is considered. The
purpose of the project level is to determine the best strategy possible for a particular
facility. The primary results of project-level management include an analysis of the
deterioration process; identification of possible maintenance strategies; and selection
of the best strategy, given resource limitations [47].
B. Asset Ownership
Depending on the legal and political structure governing the provision of infrastruc-
ture, facilities can be owned and operated by public, semi-public or private agencies.
In many states or countries, the private sector plays an active role in different aspects
of infrastructure asset management.
Public-private Partnerships (PPPs) or Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) are
provisions under which the private sector gets involved in the process of designing,
financing, constructing and operating public infrastructure facilities. Like any other
7partnership, PPPs share responsibilities by both public and private parties.
While private sector involvement in managing infrastructure assets is relatively
new in the U.S., Western European countries like France, Italy, Spain and England
have extensive experience with PPPs. Across the U.S. an increasing interest in adopt-
ing PPPs is evident. As of 2006, 21 states had enacted or introduced PPP legislation,
allowing the privatization of existing assets and many more states have such legisla-
tion in progress [1].
Figure 1 depicts the public versus private financing of infrastructure projects. In
the public finance provision, government is directly involved in operating, financing or
construction of the project. On the other hand, under private financing, a privately
held entity called a Special Purpose Vehicle is created and enters into a long-term
contract with the government to provide financing and/or operation or construction
for an infrastructure project.
1. PPPs in Transportation Infrastructure
PPPs have been used in public transportation projects since the 1960’s. Spain and
France were the first European countries to use them in their modern form to develop
their highway networks. England’s efforts to privatize its public transport services
goes back to the country’s economic problems of the 1970’s, after government invest-
ment in transportation projects reduced significantly due to international oil crisis
of 1973. The experiences gained in these projects led to the introduction of Public
Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992, which is the prototype model for modern PPPs [4].
Using PPPs for transportation projects has gained much interest in the U.S. in
recent years. Transportation infrastructure PPPs can take different forms. Typical
forms defined by FHWA [2] are Design-Build, Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
Concession, Design-Build-Operate, Long Term Lease and Lease-Develop-Operate.
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Fig. 1. Public vs. private finance.
9• Design-Build. In the Design-Build model, a single entity or a joint venture
enters into agreement for a single contract that involves both engineering ser-
vices and construction. Example: Design and construction of 47-mile E-470 toll
road in Colorado.
• O&M Concession. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) agreements allow
private entities to operate and manage existing facilities. Contracts can be
based on a fixed fee for O&M or based on delivering a certain level of service.
Example: the five year concession for maintenance of Washington D.C. streets,
tunnels, pavements, bridges, etc.
• Design-Build-Operate (Maintain). In this model, engineering/architecture
services and construction, along with maintenance of the facility, are integrated
into a single partnership and the project is financed by the public entity. Ex-
ample: The Hudson-Bergen Light Rail transit system in New Jersey.
• Design-Build-Finance-Operate. This is the same as Design Build Operate
with the exception that the private entity, which can be a single entity, or a
consortium or a joint venture, also has the responsibility to finance the project.
Example: the I-495 Capital Beltway high occupancy toll (HOT) lane in Fairfax,
Virginia.
• Long Term Lease. In this model, an existing facility (e.g. highway) is leased
to a private entity on a long term basis, conferring the right to collect tolls.
Examples: the 99-year lease of the Chicago Skyway.
• Lease-Develop-Operate. In the lease, develop and operate model, a long-
term lease is signed to grant a private party the right to operate an existing
facility. The private party can improve/expand the facility and, at the end of
10
the lease period, redeem the investment principal and the returns. Example:
the 99-year agreement to enhance, manage, operate, maintain and collect tolls
on the Pocahontas Parkway in Richmond, Virginia.
2. Benefits of PPPs
In general, involving the private sector in infrastructure asset management can provide
a diverse set of benefits. Akintoye et al. [7] described these benefits as follows:
• Enhance government’s capacity to develop an integrated solution: PPPs give
a government the opportunity to implement an integrated and better set of
services to the public, which it would otherwise be unable to implement, due to
budget limitations.
• Facilitate creative innovation approaches: The underlying project attracts var-
ious bidders to compete, based on their creative approaches to deliver required
outputs.
• Reduce the cost to implement: PPPs allow the same level of service to be deliv-
ered with lower cost in design, construction and operational period.
• Reduce the time to implement the project: Traditionally, infrastructure projects
are broken down into pieces for which each part is incorporated into a multi-
year plan. PPPs enable planning new phases while construction is underway,
facilitating on-time completion of the entire project. This would have been
impossible without private investment due to budget restrictions.
• Transfer certain risks to the private partner: An effective transfer of risk al-
lows better management of risks since each party in the partnership will take
appropriate risks according to its ability to manage that type of risk.
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• Attract larger, potentially more sophisticated bidders to the project: PPPs enable
the government to attract different types of bidders and increase competition
among bidders.
• Access skills, experience and technology: The government can gain access to
new technology and intellectual property developed in the private sector as a
result of PPP projects.
Despite these benefits, PPPs have also several drawbacks such as the possibility
of service disruption due to financial distress of the private party, the possibility of
lengthy and costly contract negotiations and increased cost of construction. Maybe
the most important drawback of PPPs is the loss of control over public services for a
long period of time. Risk management and mitigation can play an important role in
PPPs. Sound risk-management practices can significantly mitigate different types of
risk in PPPs; however, they cannot be totally eliminated.
3. Risk Allocation and Management
As one of the goals of PPPs is to share project risk between public and private
sectors, it is very important that each party undertakes the types of risk that it can
best manage. Specific risks associated with PPPs create various known or unknown
liabilities for governments. According to Shwartz et al. [56], project related risk
encountered in PPPs can be categorized and described as:
• Construction Risk: Risks stemming from low quality of design and construction
as well as project overruns.
• Financial Risk: Project’s inability to generate enough cash flow to repay loans
or capital investment.
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• Demand Risk: The possibility that the demand for the project reduces due to
economic slowdown or other issues and/or there is not enough demand for using
the service provided by the facility.
• Availability Risk: When facility does not provide the required services due to
low quality of design and construction or when service is frequently disrupted,
for example, by maintenance needs.
• Force Majeure: Risks that cannot be controlled by private or public entities,
for example, natural disasters.
• Residual Value Risk: Uncertainty over the market price of the asset at the time
when the contract expires, as in many situations an infrastructure facility will
be returned to the public owner after a certain period of time.
Experiences of different countries in privatizing infrastructure suggest that eco-
nomic infrastructure projects, such as transportation infrastructure, are good can-
didates for PPPs. Transportation infrastructure, such as roads, railways and ports,
is more attractive to the private sector than other infrastructure services, such as
health-care and education, since their risks and returns are easier to quantify and
they usually offer comparatively higher rates of return. It is also easier to charge
users directly for such infrastructure projects [8].
The major decision in the development of PPPs for both public and private part-
ners is whether to proceed with the project or not. This decision can be made by
accurately valuing the project. Financial risks and demand risk arise when project
revenues are not accurately estimated and the investment is not justified based on
the realistic assumptions of demand and construction or operating costs. Lack of
economic justification for the project will eventually lead to service disruptions, cre-
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ating otherwise non-existing financial and institutional burden for the government.
On the other hand, when demand is underestimated or construction costs are over-
estimated, tax payers are overcharged for the service provided. This is even more
important when the government is providing subsidies to supplement revenue in or-
der to make the project financially attractive to private investors. Therefore, it is
critical for both public and private entities to manage financial risk through sound
valuation approaches.
4. Real Options in Infrastructure Projects
A real option is an alternative, but not an obligation, to invest in a risky project. Real
options relate to a wide range of business decisions, like investing in a new project,
expanding product offerings, or designing a supply chain. In PPPs, real options
can be offered by the public entity to reduce investment risks and make the project
attractive for private investors. In general, a real option provides the opportunity for
the decision maker to implement an action after specific uncertainties are resolved.
Two common real options for infrastructure projects involve deferring investment
and abandoning the project.
• Option to defer investment: This option is similar to buying a “call” option
on a stock, which gives an investor the ability to postpone investment until
uncertainty is resolved. If a real option is acquired by an investor, an investment
decision can be made over a range of time until the opportunity cost of investing
in the project outweighs other available investment options.
• Option to abandon the project: This option is similar to buying a “put” option
on a stock, which gives a decision-maker flexibility to abandon the project if the
proceeds from the investment do not justify its cost. This option can be very
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attractive to investors as it allows them to sell the project at a reasonable price
and recover the initial investment.
The Balck-Scholes formula [10], developed for valuing options on publicly traded
assets, can be applied to value real options only if there exists a twin security or
a portfolio that can replicate the cash flows from real option. Refer to [61] for a
complete discussion of real options.
C. Maintenance and Rehabilitation (M&R) of Infrastructure Facilities
All infrastructure facilities deteriorate over time and must undergo periodic mainte-
nance to attain their maximum service lives. Although maintenance can slow the de-
terioration rate of infrastructure facilities, deterioration must eventually be reversed
by actions such as rehabilitation, reconstruction or retrofit so that the facility can
remain operational.
Preventive maintenance includes nonstructural maintenance actions that are in-
tended to prolong the life of the facility and are applied during the life of the facility.
For example, for pavement segments, actions like slurry sealing, or applying a thin
surface overlay are considered maintenance actions, because they reduce the rate of
deterioration, while a thick surface overlay is considered rehabilitation because it
enhances structural strength.
In some cases, due to lack of effective maintenance planning, a major rehabilita-
tion or reconstruction is needed. The cost of rehabilitation for severely deteriorated
facilities is sometimes as much as seven times more expensive than the cost of periodic
preventive maintenance actions [20]. Figure 2 shows how the cost increases as a result
of delayed maintenance. The curve indicated by “A” depicts the facility condition
under preventive maintenance while curve B shows the deterioration process with no
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maintenance action. For a pavement with a 25-year life span, 40-percent of the drop
in quality occurs during the first 75% of the life of the facility; after that, deterioration
accelerates and the next 40-percent drop in quality occurs during only 12% of the life.
0 5 10 15                             20
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Good
Fair
Poor
Very Poor
Failed
40% Drop in Quality
75% of Life
40% Drop in Quality
12% of Life
A
B
Fig. 2. Cost of delayed maintenance.
1. Network-level Management System
Many public transportation agencies have designed and implemented pavement man-
agement systems for collecting information and prescribing timely and cost-effective
M&R actions to optimally allocate resources. In transportation infrastructure termi-
nology, a facility is a segment or piece of road or highway within a network of roads
or highways. Pavement management tools were among the first infrastructure asset
management decision support softwares, but others soon followed [27]. Pavement
management systems have often been used to illustrate the concept, as pavement de-
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terioration models and treatment actions are more studied than others. According to
the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
Guidelines for Pavement Management Systems [6], a network-level pavement manage-
ment system comprises six main elements: 1) an inventory; 2) condition assessment; 3)
determination of fund needs; 4) identification and prioritization of candidate projects
when funds are constrained; 5) a method to determine the impact of funding deci-
sions on future condition and funds needed; and 6) a feedback process. The following
paragraphs describe each element in more detail.
Inventory. Inventory includes information about size, location, number of lanes,
functional classification and all the basic information concerning each facility that is
a road segment within a network of roads.
Condition assessment. Condition assessment depends on the type of facility and
starts with gathering data about the severity of distress and overall structural integrity
of the facility. This assessment allows the degree of deterioration to be determined
so that feasible maintenance and rehabilitation actions for each segment and costs of
maintenance and repair can be estimated. This information can be summarized by
an index, e.g., International Roughness Index (IRI), a condition assessment, which
represents the pavement roughness or Pavement Condition Index (PCI), which is
determined by a visual inspection that identifies the types, severities and quantities
of distresses.
Determination of fund needs. Once the inventory and condition data are col-
lected, agencies can determine the type of actions needed along with the requested
resources. Required actions are usually determined by comparing the forecasted fu-
ture state of the facility with and without maintenance or rehabilitation actions and
the effect these actions have on the facility in terms of a condition index at the end
of a specific time frame.
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Prioritization candidate sections when funds are constrained. Once an
agency determines the funds needed to maintain the facility/network in the desired
condition, funding requirements must be compared to fund availability [47]. If avail-
able funds are less than needed in any of the years, they must be allocated for the
management sections over the planning horizon. Generally, the goal is to provide the
greatest overall improvement in network condition for the funds expended.
Determining the impact of funding decisions on the future condition and
fund needs. The goal of government agencies is to provide the maximum social
benefit for the money provided to them by the public. However, other criteria can be
used instead or in combination with social benefits for allocating funds.
Feedback process. Most infrastructure management decision support systems are
implemented using empirical models and a limited amount of data. To enhance the
quality and reliability of the system, a process is needed to provide feedback on the
accuracy and reliability of prior estimates so that future estimates can be improved.
An important part of infrastructure asset management, as evidenced by network-
level pavement management systems, is resource allocation through prioritization of
candidate facilities at the network level. Since the deterioration of an infrastructure
facility is not deterministic, (i.e., the exact condition of the facility after a certain
period of time cannot be determined with certainty), a stochastic resource allocation
problem should be formulated and solved to prescribe an optimal maintenance action
for each facility, given facility condition and available resources. Having the current
condition of each facility; the conditional probabilities of future states, based on the
current condition; and the cost of M&R actions, the minimum cost M&R action for
any given facility with a specific condition can be modeled as a Markov decision
process. The Markovian assumption implies that the condition of the facility at
time t + 1 depends only on the condition at time t and the action applied to the
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facility at time t. The optimization model finds a minimum cost maintenance policy,
namely an appropriate maintenance action for each possible condition state of the
facility. However, at the network level with limited amount of resources, the optimal
solution becomes computationally expensive to obtain because the number of state-
space variables increases exponentially with the number of facilities in the network
and the number of time periods in the planing horizon.
D. Summary
Infrastructure facilities are the driving force behind the economic development of a
region. Infrastructure asset management models incorporate an economic assessment
of tradeoffs among alternative investment decisions. Asset management can span
all stages of the infrastructure life cycle: planning, programming, budgeting, design,
construction, operation, and maintenance.
In this chapter, possible arrangements between private and public entities to
own and operate infrastructure assets, the benefits of private sector involvement in
asset management, and potential risks in privatizing these assets are described. More
specifically, public-private partnerships, their benefits and common arrangements in
transportation infrastructure are discussed.
While PPPs are gaining traction in terms of both the number of investments
and the amount of capital invested, identifying and quantifying different types of
risks involved in such partnerships remains a big challenge. One of the major issues
in privatizing infrastructure projects through PPPs is project valuation. Financial
and demand risks arise when project revenues are not accurately estimated and the
investment is not justified based on the realistic assumptions of demand and con-
struction or operating costs. The inability of private owners to manage project risks
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will eventually lead to service disruptions, creating otherwise non-existing financial
and institutional burden for the government. Therefore, having a sound valuation
approach is critical for both public and private entities for managing fiscal risks in
PPPs.
Furthermore, in this chapter, issues related to maintenance and rehabilitation
of infrastructure facilities are discussed. Infrastructure facilities should undergo peri-
odic maintenance actions to maximize their service lives. Although preventive main-
tenance can slow the deterioration rate of an infrastructure facility, the effects of
deterioration eventually must be reversed by conducting rehabilitation and recon-
struction. In some cases, due to lack of effective maintenance planning, a major
rehabilitation or reconstruction is needed under ideal timing. Many public trans-
portation agencies have designed and implemented pavement management systems
for collecting information and prescribing timely and cost-effective M&R actions to
optimally allocate resources. However, finding optimal network-level M&R policies is
challenging because of uncertain deterioration of infrastructure facilities and resource
limitations.
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CHAPTER III
MEASURING RISK
Risk stems from the uncertainty of the future outcomes and its effect on decision-
maker’s objectives. In other words, risk exists whenever there is a set of possible out-
comes that can prevent the decision-maker from achieving his/her objectives. Based
on the subject area, risk can be attributed to different unfavorable outcomes. In fi-
nance, risk could be the probability that the realized return is less than the expected
return, while in an engineering setting, risk can be defined as the probability that
entire or part of an engineering system does not meet expectations.
A. Risk Management
In a broad sense, managing risk involves identifying, quantifying and assessing dif-
ferent types of risk in the system along with strategies to manage them. A wide
range of strategies, like accepting and preparing for the aftermath, reducing the im-
pact, transferring the risk to other parties, and avoiding the risk all together, can
be implemented to manage risk. Most recently, International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) has published ISO 31000 [24], a family of standards relating to
risk management practices. According to ISO 31000, the process of risk management
consists of the following steps:
• Establishing the context
• Risk Assessment
– Risk Identification
– Risk Analysis
21
– Risk Evaluation
• Risk Treatment
Establishing the context involves recognition of risks in the domain of interest,
the stakeholder and all who will be affected by the risks. Risk assessment consists
of identification, analysis, and evaluation of risks. Risk identification and analysis is
a systematic approach to identifying and locating different types of risks that might
exist along with the cause and effect of such events and their consequences for the
system. It also involves estimating the probabilities of such events. The result of this
step can be presented in a quantitative or qualitative manner depending on the type
of the risk and the extent of information about the future events. The final step in
risk assessment is risk evaluation, through which identified risks are evaluated and
prioritized based on their level of importance. Risk treatment involves evaluation of
risk treatment options with cost and benefit analysis and, ultimately, selection and
implementation of the appropriate treatment option.
B. Quantifying Risk
The risk management standard that we discussed in the previous section contains
two major elements. Firstly, after different types of risk are identified in the system,
these risks must be expressed in either quantitative or qualitative form. Secondly,
the decision-maker must allocate scarce resources to mitigate or eliminate the risks.
Having limited resources at hand, often times resources should be allocated by for-
mulating and solving an optimization model. Due to presence of random variables
in the model, stochastic optimization techniques should be used to solve the problem
which can be computationally expensive. As a result, using a measure of risk that
can be incorporated into optimization modeling with less computational burden is
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important in choosing an appropriate measure of risk.
In general, two approaches for measuring risk are by measuring deviation of
the underlying random variable from a constant value or by using a surrogate for the
amount of risk (e.g., mean or worst possible value of the future outcomes) [51]. Tradi-
tionally, expected utility theory and certainty equivalent have been used as a surrogate
for measuring risk of risky bets. Expected utility theory is based on four axioms of
rationality originally presented by Neumann and Morgenstern [44]. In the context of
expected utility, certainty equivalent and risk premium are two important and closely
related concepts. Certainty equivalent is defined as a payoff that a decision-maker
considers as the equivalent of the risky bet or gamble and risk premium is the amount
that a risk-averse decision-maker is willing to forgo to obtain a certain payoff. More
generally, a decision-maker is said to be risk-neutral if the difference between expected
payoff and certainty equivalent is zero; risk-averse, if the difference is positive; and
risk-loving if the difference is negative.
1. Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is the tendency of a decision-maker to accept a certain amount instead
of a gamble that offers equal or greater expected payoff. Suppose the decision-maker
holds utility U for random variable X, which represents different realizations of wealth
in the future. We denote by E[U(X)] the expected utility of random variable X.
The certainty equivalent is the amount y such that U(y) = E[U(X)]. CE[X] is a
conventional notation for denoting the certainty equivalent of a random variable X.
Risk-averse utility functions take the form of non-increasing concave functions.
Two major family of risk-averse utility functions are functions with the Constant Ab-
solute Risk Aversion (CARA) property and functions with the Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) property. The exponential utility function U(X) = − exp(−aX),
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in which a is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, exhibits the CARA property.
This function has also ∆ property which is an important property stating that, if a
constant ∆ is added to a random variable, the certainty equivalent is increased by
the same amount,
CE(X + ∆) = CE(X) + ∆.
This property implies that the risk premium of the gamble does not depend on the
initial wealth of the decision-maker.
Rabin [49] and Rabin and Thaler [50], have raised a question concerning the
application of expected utility theory to explain risk-aversion for gambles involving
both small and large stakes. They show that not accepting a small positive gamble,
implies not accepting a large favorable gamble under the concave utility function.
While utility theory plays an important role in the development of many theories
in economics and decision-making under uncertainty, the difficulties and sometimes
impracticalities in deriving a utility function and related parameters have hindered
the application of expected utility in many practical settings.
Value at Risk. A risk measure that has been widely used in financial risk manage-
ment practices and has been written in financial regulations (Basel I and Basel II)
is Value at Risk (VaR). VaR, by definition, is the amount of loss at a certain confi-
dence level. Given the random variable X with the cumulative distribution function
FX(y) = P{X ≤ y}, and for some confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), Value at Risk with
respect to α is,
VaRα(X) = min{y|FX(y) ≥ α}.
Value at Risk is easy to understand and conveys an intuitive measure of risk.
However, despite its ease of use and intuitiveness, VaR does not have appealing
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mathematical properties. VaRα(X) can increase significantly with a small change in
α and is a non-convex and discontinuous function for discrete probability distribu-
tions, which makes it difficult to incorporate into optimization modeling. In addition,
VaR only measures risk at certain level and ignores scenarios in the tail distribution.
Chance constraint is equivalent to a VaR constraint in optimization and they are well
known for introducing non-convexity in the problem.
A more modern definition of risk measures is presented by coherent measures of
risk. Following the pioneering work of Artzner et al. [9] and Delbaen [15], in which
they provided the basic axiomatic properties that a functional should have to be a
good quantifier of risk, the properties of coherent risk measures are developed into
four axioms of coherency as follows.
C. Coherent Measure of Risk
A coherent measure of risk is a functional R : L2 → (−∞,∞] that has the
following properties:
1. R(C) = C for all constants C.
2. R((1− λ)X + λX ′) ≤ (1− λ)R(X) + λR(X ′) for λ ∈ (0, 1) (convexity).
3. R(X) ≤ R(X ′) when X ≤ X ′ (monotonicity).
4. R(X) ≤ 0 when ||Xk −X||2 → 0 with R(Xk) ≤ 0 (closedness).
It will be a coherent measure of risk in basic sense if it also satisfies:
5. R(λX) = λR(X) for λ > 0 (positive homogeneity).
In the original definition, the first property was presented as the following rela-
tion, which follows from (1) and (2) in the current definition,
R(X + C) = R(X) + C.
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Also, the subadditivity property can be derived from (2) and (5),
R(X +X ′) ≤ R(X) +R(X ′). (3.1)
While coherent risk measures were developed initially for banking regulation
and tailored toward financial applications, they have far more repercussions and can
be used in wider range of applications in which traditional approaches to risk and
uncertainty are under criticism [51].
Conditional value at risk. Conditional value at risk (CVaR) is a coherent risk
measure that specifies average loss at a certain confidence level. CVaR has subad-
ditivity property (3.1), a key property lacking in other measures of risk like VaR.
α-CVaR by definition is the expected loss under the (1−α)-percent of the tail of loss
distribution. The attractive mathematical properties and appealing intuitive meaning
of CVaR make it an effective risk measure for use in risk-based optimization modeling
and decision-making processes. Let CVaRα(X) denote the CVaR of X at confidence
level of α ∈ (0, 1), then CVaR can be calculated as follows,
α-VaR
Frequency
α-CVaR
Loss
Maximum Loss
1 - α
Fig. 3. Value at risk and conditional value at risk.
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CVaRα(X) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ydFX,α(y),
where
FX,α(y) =
 0, if y < VaRα(X),(FX(y)− α)/(1− α), if y > VaRα(X).
Figure 3 depicts the graphical representation of VaR, CVaR and the maximum
loss. α-CVaR(X) is continuous with respect to α and can be linearized and used in
convex optimization models to restrict the maximum loss to a certain level. CVaR
generally performs well when an accurate model or a good estimator of the tail dis-
tribution exists [54].
D. Portfolio Risk and Return
Traditionally, portfolios of securities have been constructed using the celebrated mean-
variance methodology introduced by Markovitz [40]. In mean-variance portfolio op-
timization, a portfolio of assets based on the trade-off between the expected returns
and risk is selected. The optimization problem consists of finding a portfolio that has
the best expected return at a certain level of risk represented by standard deviation
of returns. A set of portfolios called the efficient frontier can be found by solving
this optimization problem for different levels of risk. An efficient frontier consist of
portfolios that offer the best mix of risk and return among all levels of risk and return
to the investor, i.e. provides the highest expected return with a given level of risk.
While in finance or any decision-making process that involves monetary values, down-
side risk is of utmost concern, by using variance to control risk in the mean-variance
framework, both upside and downside risks will be affected.
Both CVaR and VaR can be used for limiting downside risks in a portfolio op-
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timization model in the general mean-risk framework in which the trade-off between
mean return and a measure of risk are considered. However, CVaR is convex and can
be represented with linear constraints in a convex optimization model. Ogryczak and
Ruszczynski [45] have demonstrated that a portfolio constructed through the mean-
CVaR model satisfies the second order stochastic dominance criterion. Krokhmal et
al. [30] have shown that the the mean-risk portfolio problem in which risk is measured
by CVaR can be formulated in three different ways and all three will generate the
same efficient frontier.
Theorem D.1 Let us consider the risk function φα(x) and reward function R(x)
dependent on the decision vector x, and the following three problems:
(P1) minx φα(x)− µR(x), x ∈ X, µ ≥ 0,
(P2) minx φα(x), R(x) ≥ ρ, x ∈ X,
(P3) minx R(x), φα(x) ≤ w, x ∈ X.
Varying the parameters µ, ρ, and w, traces the efficient risk-return frontiers for the
problems (P1)-(P3), accordingly. If φα(x) is convex, R(x) is concave and the set X
is convex, then the three problems, (P1)-(P3), generate the same efficient frontier.
Refer to [30] for the proof.
E. Summary
In this chapter, we presented a formal definition of risk along with standard risk man-
agement practices. Further, we described expected utility and certainty equivalent as
traditional measures of risk and a coherent risk measure as a modern measure of risk.
We provided the definition of coherent risk measures and compared Value at Risk
and Conditional Value at Risk as two widely used measure of risk for financial risk
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management. As a convex measure of risk, CVaR can be incorporated into convex
optimization models.
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CHAPTER IV
VALUING RISKY PROJECTS IN PARTIALLY COMPLETE MARKETS
This chapter presents a valuation approach for large-scale engineering projects. The
value of a project is defined through the difference between the value of an optimal
mean-CVaR portfolio of the project and securities and a portfolio that only consists
of securities. We show that the value obtained in this way is consistent with the
value obtained from standard option pricing. Further, we demonstrate that in this
approach, the problem of valuing a project and finding optimal security investment
weights can be decomposed into two separate problems and can be solved separately
with the output from one being used as input for the other. These two results are
presented by Smith and Nau [60] for a decision-maker that uses exponential utility
function in maximizing the utility of cash flows. Furthermore, a valuation procedure
is introduced that employs CVAR to value the private risk cash flows and market
information to value market uncertainties. By following this procedure, a decision-
maker can discover the value without constructing an optimal mean-CVaR portfolio
of the project and securities. Finally, we present the application of this valuation
approach to valuing a transportation PPP.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, background and preliminaries are dis-
cussed in Sections A and B. In Section C, mean-CVaR portfolio optimization model is
presented. Section D discusses valuation in complete markets and partially complete
markets. Section E presents results of a case study, and summary of the results is
presented in Section G.
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A. Introduction
Capital budgeting or the process of determining the value of a firm’s long-term invest-
ments, has been the subject of many studies by both decision scientists and financial
economists. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis is the classical approach for eco-
nomical analysis of investment decisions. In DCF analysis, project’s net present value
(NPV) is calculated by discounting future cash flows with a risk-adjusted rate of re-
turn. The discount rate consists of two elements; risk-free rate and risk premium.
Risk-free rate is the rate on a risk-free investment and risk premium is the extra
return added to the risk-free rate to justify uncertainty in the cash flows. Find-
ing an appropriate discount rate for a given cash flow stream is a challenging task
especially if the asset that generates cash flows is non-tradable. In the context of valu-
ing a risky project, a non-tradable non-diversifiable asset, e.g. a large infrastructure
project, poses several unique challenges in determining the value of a risky project to
a decision-maker. The biggest source of difficulty in valuing such projects comes from
the non-diversification and lack of liquidity of private company’s assets. Managerial
flexibility or real options that give investor the right but not obligation to invest
in the project over a certain period of time, are other issues that bring additional
complexity to the valuation process.
There are several drawbacks in calculating the value of a risky project using
DCF analysis. First, it is usually difficult to find an appropriate discount rate. Two
common methods for determining a discount rate are Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) [57] or Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) that is the average rate of
company’s sources of financing from debt and equity. In CAPM, discount rate is cal-
culated from the risk-free rate and a factor that measures the volatility of underlying
asset returns compared to the volatility of publicly traded companies. Basic assump-
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tion in CAPM is that the asset will be added to a well-diversified portfolio of assets.
This is necessary because the discount rate calculated in this way only accounts for
systematic or the overall market risks. CAPM cannot be used for discounting cash
flows of a stand-alone risky project since they are susceptible to project-specific uncer-
tainties that cannot be diversified away by constructing a portfolio of publicly traded
assets. Finding a discount rate by calculating the weighted average cost of capital
may not accurately represent the underlying risks since it is calculated from the firm’s
historical performance, or from the industry’s average WACC. In addition, the NPV
calculated in DCF analysis is very sensitive to a small change in the discount rate.
Finally, a decision-maker’s exposure to risk can not be properly captured in DCF
analysis.
Option pricing techniques to value a risky asset based on the Black and Sc-
holes [10] model, in which a project is valued according to a portfolio of securities,
is another approach to value risky projects. One of the major assumptions in the
option pricing approach is the existence of a twin security or a portfolio of securities
that has exactly the same payoffs as the project in every time and state of future.
Under this assumption, project risks can be perfectly hedged by trading in securities,
and the value of the project is equal to the buying and selling value of the replicating
portfolio. Equivalently, a discount rate can be calculated for DCF analysis from the
future returns and present value of the replicating portfolio for discounting project
cash flows.
One can also use decision analysis to compute the value of a risky project. In
decision analysis approach, the value of a project is calculated by using subjective
probabilities along with a utility function that measures the utility of decision-maker
for consuming cash flows. This approach depends heavily on expected utility axioms
originally developed by Neumann and Morgenstern [44]. Aside from difficulties and
32
impracticalities of deriving a utility function and related parameters for a decision-
maker, expected utility theory has been under criticism for sometimes being incon-
sistent in representing decision-maker’s risk-aversion, particularly in the case of large
wagers [49].
Mattar and Cheah [42] classify different type of risks in an infrastructure project
into market, unique and private risks, and suggest that large-scale engineering and
infrastructure projects are exposed to high level of private risks. Through an example
that involves valuation of a real option for oil exploration, they showed that different
risk premiums placed on private risks can significantly change the value calculated
in this way. Garvin and Cheah [21] provided a review of conventional valuation
techniques for risky assets and applied a valuation approach that relies on a risk-
adjusted rate of return on a toll road project in Virginia based on the project’s
historical data. Zhang [65] presented a financial evaluation method to determine the
optimal capital structure and financial viability of infrastructure projects, while Zhao
and Tseng [66] discussed the application of stochastic diffusion processes to value
flexibility in infrastructure project design and construction.
Smith and Nau [60] showed that when decision analysis or option pricing is
properly applied to value a risky project, they both should give the same value if
securities markets are complete. Furthermore, they pioneered the definition of market
and private uncertainties and presented an integrated valuation procedure in the
case of partially complete markets, i.e., in which project cash flows can not be fully
replicated by a trading strategy. More specifically, markets are partially complete if
events in the project provide no information about future market events. In other
words, only parts of the project risk that are related to market events can be hedged
with trading in market securities.
Smith and McCardle [59] applied this approach to valuing oil contracts. Their
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analysis takes into account commodity prices, production estimate uncertainties and
management’s ability to change the production rate and opportunities for price hedg-
ing, in valuing oil properties. While this approach is novel in recognizing the effects of
market and private risks on project valuation and integrating them into a valuation
procedure, it suffers from difficulties and sometimes impracticality of using a utility
function, like any other model based on the expected utility. In this chapter, a val-
uation approach for valuing a risky project in partially complete markets, in which
project cash flows cannot be fully replicated, is presented. The goal is to develop
a valuation approach that is consistent with the standard option pricing framework
and in which decision-maker’s risk preference can be expressed in a natural way with
a minimum amount of subjectivity.
B. Preliminaries
We study valuation of a risky project from the perspective of a risk-averse owner
or a manager whose risk preference reflects those of all stakeholders. Without this
assumption it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover the project’s value, since
otherwise all risk preferences should be incorporated into the model. Let us assume
that state of the world is finite and represented by vector η = (η1, η2, .., ηs) that
can be decomposed into market and private states η = (ηm,ηp), and are revealed
at discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, .., T . The final state of the world is revealed at time-
T ; at earlier times, the firm has some information about the final state denoted
by time-t state of information ωt. States of information are subsets of the possible
states, a vector of market and private states, i.e., ωt = (ω
m
t , ω
p
t ) that are partitions
of η and are mutually exclusive and become sequentially smaller with increasing
t. Let xt(ωt) be a random variable representing project’s cash flow at time t in
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state ωt. In addition to the project, the firm can invest in securities by building
a portfolio of securities, and rebalance the holdings during the project time period.
Trading can take place on N + 1 securities at discrete time periods with price vector
st(ωt) = (s
0
t (ωt), s
1
t (ωt), ..., s
N
t (ωt)), where s
i
t(ωt) is the price of i
th security at time t
in a given state ωt and s
0
t (ωt) being the risk-free security. We denote by ϕt(ωt) =
[ϕ0t (ωt), ϕ
1
t (ωt), ..., ϕ
N
t (ωt)] a trading strategy that is a positive or negative holding of
securities from time t to t+ 1.
1. Complete Markets
A complete market is a market in which the price of all goods or services can be
discovered. If markets are complete, a complete set of future payoffs for a given risky
project can be constructed with existing securities in the market. Denote by P the set
of all payoffs that can be constructed by trading strategy ϕt(ωt) on N + 1 securities
and M states and (M ×N + 1) matrix St(ωt) whose rows are st(ωt),
P = {k ∈ RM : k = St(ωt)ϕTt (ωt), ϕ ∈ RN+1}.
Security markets are complete if the rank of St(ωt) is greater than or equal to
M for each t, i.e., portfolio payoffs k can span the space of all possible project cash
flows [33]. When markets are complete and there is no opportunity for arbitrage (e.g.
there is no possibility for a positive immediate gain without taking any risk), value
of a risky project can be determined from a replicating portfolio based on the law of
one price. The law of one price states that if there exists a replicating portfolio that,
if combined with borrowing or lending, can accurately replicate cash flows of another
security, they both should have the same price.
In complete markets, for any given project with no private uncertainty, a portfolio
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of securities can be constructed that replicates project’s cash flows ct(ωt) at all times
and all states by the replicating trading strategy ϕ˜ as follows,
[ϕ˜t−1(ωt−1)− ϕ˜t(ωt)]st(ωt) = ct(ωt),∀t > 0, ωt. (4.1)
The final replicating portfolio at time T is a zero-weight holding of securities for
all ωT (the product here is a dot product). In the reminder of this chapter, ϕt(ωt)
and st(ωt) are suppressed to ϕt and st, respectively, for convenience.
2. Risk-neutral Pricing
An alternative and straightforward way of pricing risky assets in complete markets
is risk-neutral pricing in which value of the project is determined through a set of
risk-neutral probabilities instead of a risk-adjusted rate of return.
Luenberger [36] describes deriving risk-neutral probabilities from replicating
portfolio as follows. Define by elementary state security a security that has payoff in
only one state m, em = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where 1 is payoff at state m and has
positive price ζm. If a complete set of state securities exists (at least one for each
state), value of the project c can be obtained from the elementary state securities
based on linear pricing principle. Linear pricing principle states that if there are
two securities with price p1 and p2, the price of combined security must be p1 + p2,
otherwise, it will result in an opportunity for arbitrage.
A single-period project c that has payoff pm,m ∈M , at state m, can be described
as the combination of elementary securities, c =
∑M
m=1 p
mem. Therefore, based on
the linearity of pricing, price of c must be,
v =
∑
m∈M
pmζm. (4.2)
36
Let ζ∗ =
M∑
m=1
ζm, and let pim = ζm/ζ
∗. The values pim that are calculated in this
way can be considered as probabilities since they are positive and sum to one. Then,
the project value can be obtained by,
v = ζ∗
M∑
m=1
pimp
m. (4.3)
Denote by Epi expectation with respect to pi, then we can rewrite Equation (4.3)
as,
v = ζ∗Epi [p] . (4.4)
Because ζ∗ =
∑M
m−1 ζm, ζ
∗ can be interpreted as the price of security (1,1,...,1)
whose payoff is 1 at every state, i.e., a risk-free security. The price of such security,
by definition, is 1
R
where R is the risk-free return. Therefore, (4.4) can be written as,
v =
1
R
Epi [p] . (4.5)
Equation (4.5) states that the value of the project is equal to the discounted
expected value of its payoffs under risk-neutral probabilities.
More generally, if there are n states and at least n independent securities for each
state with known prices vi, risk neutral probabilities can be computed by a system of
equations as follows,
vi =
1
R
M∑
m=1
pimp
m
i i = 1, 2, . . . , n (4.6)
for n unknown pim.
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C. Mean-CVaR Portfolio Optimization
As discussed in Chapter III, the objective of mean-CVaR portfolio optimization is to
maximize expected return subject to downside risk expressed by CVaR. Denote by
x(t,ϕt) cash flows generated from ϕt at time t,
x(t,ϕt) = [ϕt−1 −ϕt]st,
and by Ψ(ϕt, .) resulting distribution function of the cash flows at time-t. The α-VaR
of the loss associated with the decision variables ϕt is given by
ζα(ϕt) = min{ζ : Ψ(ϕt, ζ) ≥ α}.
The α-CVaR φα(ϕt) of the loss associated with the decision variable ϕt is given
by the mean of α-tail distribution of NPV of cash flows. The loss being the negative
of returns, φα(x) can be calculated from,
φα(ϕt) = min
ζ
Fα(ϕt, ζ),
with
Fα(ϕt, ζ) = ζ +
1
1− αE{[−x(t,ϕt)− ζ]
+},
where [t]+ = max{0, t}. This representation of CVaR is convex and continuously
differentiable and can be linearized through auxiliary variables and be used within a
linear programming model [52, 53].
We would like to maximize expected NPV of the cash flows generated from
the multi-period trading strategy ϕ given the α-CVaR constraint. Denoting by
Γ{x(0,ϕ), x(1,ϕ), ..., x(T,ϕ)} the expected NPV of cash flows generated by trad-
ing strategy ϕ and α-CVaR risk measure, the mean-CVaR portfolio optimization
problem can be formulated as follows,
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max Γ{x(0,ϕ), x(1,ϕ), ..., x(T,ϕ)} := max
ϕ∈ϕ
E
[
T∑
t=0
x(t,ϕt)
(1 + rf )t
]
s.t.
T∑
t=0
φ(ϕt)
(1 + rf )t
≤ w,
where w is the maximum risk allowed.
1. Breakeven Buying and Selling Prices
Founded on the mean-CVaR portfolio optimization model, we present a general defini-
tion for the buying and selling price of a risky project for a risk-averse decision maker.
As discussed earlier, this valuation approach is based on the risk attitude of an owner
or manager whose risk preference reflects that of all stackholders. Breakeven buying
price is the price at which the firm is indifferent between investing in the project
and doing nothing. Similarly, breakeven selling price is the price at which the firm
is indifferent between selling the project and doing nothing. Let us assume a firm is
considering to invest in a risky project that generates risky cash flow stream ct at time
t, while it has the opportunity to invest in security markets. Denote by x−(t,ϕ−) the
time-t cash flows resulting from investing in securities, and x+(t,ϕ+) the time-t cash
flows resulting from investing in both the project and securities. Then
x−(t,ϕ−) = [ϕ−t−1 −ϕ−t ]st,
and
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x+(t,ϕ+) = [ϕ+t−1 −ϕ+t ]st + ct.
We define the breakeven buying price of the project as the time zero lump-sum value
vb that makes the following equality hold,
max
ϕ+
Γ{x+(0,ϕ+)− vb, x+(1,ϕ+), ..., x+(T,ϕ+)} =
max
ϕ−
Γ{x−(0,ϕ−), x−(1,ϕ−), ..., x−(T,ϕ−)}. (4.7)
Similarly, we define the breakeven selling price of the project as the time zero
lump-sum value vs that makes the following equality hold,
max
ϕ+
Γ{x+(0,ϕ+), x+(1,ϕ+), ..., x+(T,ϕ+)} =
max
ϕ−
Γ{x−(0,ϕ−) + vs, x−(1,ϕ−), ..., x−(T,ϕ−)}. (4.8)
To guarantee that the breakeven buying and selling prices as defined by (4.7)
and (4.8) exist, for both definitions, we assume that the problems are feasible i.e. the
optimal solutions are finite and can be obtained by a trading strategy.
D. Project Valuation
In complete markets, when decision analysis or option pricing is properly applied to
value a risky project, the two methods should be consistent in providing the same
value. Furthermore, in complete markets, the grand problem of determining value
of the project and optimal investment in securities can be divided into two separate
problems; 1) investment problem and 2) financing problem. The output from the
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investment problem, which is the value of the project, can be used for solving the
financing problem, which is the optimal portfolio of security holdings [60].
1. Valuation in Complete Markets
In this section, we establish the consistency and separation results for the mean-
CVaR approach in complete markets. First, if markets are complete, the buying and
selling prices as defined by (4.7) and (4.8) should be equal to the value obtained from
standard option pricing approach.
Theorem D.1 (Consistency Theorem) If security markets are complete, then the
firm’s breakeven buying and selling prices for any project are both equal to the value
given by option pricing.
Proof Let x+(t,ϕ+) be the cash flow from investing in project and securities and
x−(t,ϕ−) be the cash from from investing only in securities, then we can write ϕ+ =
ϕ− − ϕ˜. The cash flow from investing in the securities and project is
x+(t,ϕ+) = [ϕ+t −ϕ+t−1]st + ct
= [ϕ−t −ϕ−t−1]st − [ϕ˜t − ϕ˜t−1]st + ct.
The last two terms cancel each other out by the definition of replicating portfolio
according to (4.1) for all t > 0. For t = 0 we have,
x+(0,ϕ+) = x−(0,ϕ−) + ϕ˜0s0 + c0.
Therefore, in order for (4.7) to hold, vb must be equal to ϕ˜0s0 + c0, which is the
time-0 value of replicating portfolio and also the value obtained using standard op-
tion pricing. The consistency of breakeven selling price can be proved by the same
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approach.
To illustrate this result, we use the same capital budgeting example used in the
literature. In this example a firm is facing three possibilities and would like to find
the value of each possibility. The three possibilities are 1) to invest $104 in a project
that has $180 payoff in the high state and $60 in the low state; 2) acquire the option
to defer investment for one year. After one year, if market is strong, then the firm
can invest in the project or walk away if market is weak; 3) do nothing. Figure 4
depicts the decision tree representing cash flows resulting from each alternative. The
numbers in the right show net present values discounted at risk-free rate (8%). We
assume that there is a twin security that has the current market price of $20 and
whose payoff is $36 in the high state and $12 in the low state. If w0 and w1 are
the weights of risk-free and twin security in the portfolio, the replicating portfolio for
invest now option can be derived from the following system of equations, w0(1.08) + w1(36) = 180w0(1.08) + w1(12) = 60.
The solution is w0 = 0 and w1 = 5 and since each share of twin security is
priced at $20, value of the invest option is 5× 20 = 100, minus the time-0 cash flow
of $104 that yields -$4. Alternatively, risk-neutral probabilities can be derived from
pi(36)+(1−pi)(12)
1+0.08
= 20, that will result in pi = .4 and NPV = 180×.4+60×.6
1.08
− 104 = −4.
According to (4.7), buying price of the project is the value that if added to time-0
cash flows, it sets the difference between the solution of mean-CVaR optimization
problems with and without the project to zero. In this case, -4 sets the difference to
zero. The project payoffs and CVaR values before valuation are depicted in Figure 5
and the projects payoffs and CVaR values after the valuation is depicted in Figure 6.
The expected returns are calculated from the solutions of the optimization problems
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Current Year One NPV @ 8%
50% -104 180 62.67
50% -104 60 -48.44
0 67.7 62.67
50%
0 0 0
0 -52.2 -48.44
50%
0 0 0
0 0 0
Cash Flow
-PROJECT- 
Decline 
Invest Now 
High 
Low 
Defer 
High 
Invest 
Decline 
Low 
Invest 
Decline 
Fig. 4. Decision tree.
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in (4.7). Table I shows the portfolio weights as the result of investing in only securities;
solution of the right optimization problem and Table II shows the portfolio weights
by investing in the project and securities; solution to the left optimization problem
in (4.7). The difference between NPV of expected returns is zero when the project is
valued at -$4.
NPV @ 8%
90%-
CVaR
Project 180 62.667
-104 -48.444
60 -48.444
Twin Security 36 13.333
-20 -8.8889
12 -8.8889
Risk-free Security -1 1.08 1.08
Fig. 5. Project, twin security and risk-free security cash flows with CVaR values before
valuation.
Table I. Portfolio weights by investing in only securities.
Weights Expected Return
Twin security 10.125 243.00
Risk-free security 97.50 105.30
Total 348.30
The option pricing value of defer alternative can be obtained from,
 w0(1.08) + w1(36) = 67.68w0(1.08) + w1(12) = 0,
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NPV @ 8%
90%-
CVaR
Project 180 66.667
-100 -44.444
60 -44.444
Twin Security 36 13.333
-20 -8.8889
12 -8.8889
Risk-free Security -1 1.08 1.08
Fig. 6. Project, twin security and risk-free security cash flows with CVaR values after
valuation.
Table II. Portfolio weights by investing in the project and securities.
Weights Expected Return
Twin security 5.125 123
Risk-free security 97.50 105.30
Project 1 120
Total 348.30
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that yields w0 = −31.33 and w1 = 2.82. The value of defer option is the current
value of this portfolio, -$31.33+2.82×($20)=$25.07 that is the same as buying price
of the project obtained from (4.7). Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate the project payoffs
and CVaR values before and after valuation. Table III shows the portfolio weights as
the result of investing in only securities; solution to the right optimization problem
in (4.7). Table IV shows the portfolio weights by investing in the defer option and
securities; solution to the left optimization problem in (4.7). The difference between
the NPV of expected returns is zero when the defer option is valued at $25.07.
NPV @ 8%
90%-
CVaR
Project  67.68 62.667
0 0
0 0
Twin Security 36 13.333
-20 -8.8889
12 -8.8889
Risk-free Security -1 1.08 1.08
Fig. 7. Defer option, twin security and risk-free security cash flows with CVaR values
before valuation.
Table III. Defer option: portfolio weights by investing in only securities.
Weights Expected Return
Twin security 6.75 162.00
Risk-free security 165.00 178.20
Total 340.20
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NPV @ 8%
90%-
CVaR
Project  67.68 37.6
-25.067 -21.933
0 -25.067
Twin Security 36 13.333
-20 -8.8889
12 -8.8889
Risk-free Security -1 1.08 1.08
Fig. 8. Defer option, twin security and risk-free security cash flows with CVaR values
after valuation.
Table IV. Defer option: portfolio weights by investing in the project and securities.
Weights Expected Return
Twin security 3.93 94.32
Risk-free security 196.33 212.04
Project 1 33.84
Total 340.20
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The best project management strategy can be found by solving the investment
problem that is the alternative with the highest value. Further, the results of the in-
vestment problem can be used to solve the financing problem whose output is optimal
weight of securities.
Theorem D.2 (Separation Theorem) Given a risky project c, if the securities market
is complete, let κ∗ be a maximizing project strategy obtained from
v∗ = max
κ
Epi[
T∑
t=0
cκt
(1 + rf )t
],
and let ϕr
∗
be the replicating trading strategy for cκ
∗
. Let ϕf
∗
denote a trading strategy
that maximizes,
max
ϕf
Γ{xf (0,ϕf ) + v∗, xf (1,ϕf ), ..., xf (T,ϕf )},
where
xf (t,ϕ
f ) = [ϕft−1 −ϕft ]st.
Then κ∗ and ϕg
∗
= ϕf
∗ −ϕr∗ solves the grand problem
max
ϕg ,κ
Γ{xg(0;κ,ϕg), xg(1;κ,ϕg), ..., xf (T ;κ,ϕg)},
where
xg(t, κ,ϕ
g) = [ϕgt−1 −ϕgt ]st + cκt .
Proof For κ = κ∗ and ϕg = ϕf−ϕr∗ , the time-t cash flows generated from the grand
problem is xg(t;κ
∗,ϕg) = [ϕft−1 − ϕft ]st − [ϕr∗t−1 − ϕr∗t−1]st + cκ∗t . The last two terms
cancel by the definition of replicating portfolio according to (4.1) for all t > 0. For
t = 0, xg(t;κ
∗,ϕg) = xf (0,ϕf ) + v∗, which is the exact cash flows as the financing
problem. Therefore, ϕg
∗
= ϕf
∗ −ϕr∗ .
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In the capital budgeting example, the optimal project management strategy is
to acquire the defer option since the value of invest now is -4 and the value of defer
option is 25.07. Given that deferring the investment is the optimal strategy, the
financing problem can be solved to find the optimal weight of securities by adding
this value to the time-0 cash flows. The optimal weights are w0 = 6.75 and w1 = 165.
The replicating portfolio for defer option as obtained earlier is w0 = −31.33 and w1 =
2.82. According to the separation theorem, the optimal weight of securities in the
grand problem can be obtained by subtracting the solution of financing problem from
replicating portfolio that yields w0 = 165 + 31.33 = 196.33, w1 = 6.75− 2.82 = 3.93.
These weights are exactly the weights that are found and shown in Table IV.
2. Valuation in Incomplete Markets
In general, when markets are incomplete, i.e., when state prices are not unique, one
can not find a unique value for a risky project based on the risk-neutral probabilities
since these probabilities are no longer unique. These probabilities are not unique since
the market prices do not span the space of all possible project cash flows, a condition
that was required for complete markets and discussed in Section 4.6. When markets
are incomplete, only an upper and lower bound can be established for the project’s
value. These bounds are obtained from calculating the expected value with respect to
a set of probability distributions generated from risk-neutral pricing approach. The
bounds that can be obtained for the project with a risky cash flows of ct and a set of
risk-neutral distributions pi ∈ Π are,
vˆ = sup Epi
[
T∑
t=0
ct
(1 + rf )t
]
and
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vˇ = inf Epi
[
T∑
t=0
ct
(1 + rf )t
]
.
3. Valuation in Partially Complete Markets
Assuming that the project risk can be decomposed into market and private risks
stemming from market uncertainties and firm’s private uncertainties, we will extend
mean-CVaR valuation presented in the previous section to the case of partially com-
plete markets. As discussed earlier, markets are partially complete if the events in
the project provide no information about future market events and only parts of the
project risk that are related to market events can be hedged with trading in market
securities. To generalize the mean-risk model to partially complete markets, we first
define φ[.|ωmt , ωt−1].
Definition φt[.|ωmt , ωt−1] is the time-t CVaR of the private risk cash flows.
Given the definition of time-t CVaR of private risk cash flows, we can define the
CVaR replicating strategy ϕ˜t in partially complete markets.
Definition ϕ˜t replicating strategy in partially complete markets is a replicating
strategy that matches the time-t CVaR value in all market states. The final repli-
cating strategy at time T ϕ˜ωT = 0. For any earlier time, given ϕ˜t(ωt) for all ωt ,
ϕ˜t−1(ωt) can be obtained from,
ϕ˜t−1st(ω
m
t ) = φt[ct(ωt) + ϕ˜t(ωt)st(ω
m
t )|ωmt , ωt−1]. (4.9)
For every ωt−1 (4.9) defines a set of K equations for N + 1 unknowns, where K
is the number of market states ωmt in ωt−1.
As in complete markets, the project is valued at the market value of the CVaR
replicating strategy at time-0 plus any cash flow from the project at time-0. However,
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to value the project according to breakeven buying and selling prices as defined by
(4.7) and (4.8), in partially complete markets, the cash flows generated from investing
in both the project and securities should be refined as follows,
x+(t,ϕ+) = [ϕ+t−1 −ϕ+t ]st + yt(ωmt ),
where
yt(ω
m
t ) = φt[ct|ωmt , ωpt−1].
In this definition, ct is replaced by yt(ω
m
t ) because private risk cash flows are
measured by CVaR for every market state. This definition generalizes the earlier
definition of x+(t,ϕ+), as in the absence of private uncertainties, yt(ω
m
t ) = ct(ωt).
The cash flows from investing in securities stays the same as the private risk cash
flows are only defined over the project cash flows.
To demonstrate valuation in partially complete markets, private uncertainties are
added to the the capital budgeting example discussed before. The updated decision
tree is depicted in Figure 9. This figure shows the invest now alternative cash flows
for a decision-maker that, in addition to market uncertainties, is faced with private
risk stemmed from uncertainty in the firm’s efficiency.
Let us assume that the decision-maker’s preference for the private risk cash flows
is expressed by 40%-CVaR (1 − α = 40%). In other words, the decision-maker
considers only average over the 40% of the tail distribution of cash flows. The first
equation is written for 40%-CVaR of the private risk cash flows for the high state
that is 170, and the second equation is 40%-CVaR for the low state that is 45. In
this case, the CVaR replicating strategy can be obtained from the following system
of equations,
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 w0(1.08) + w1(36) = 170w0(1.08) + w1(12) = 45.
The solution is to buy 5.20833 shares of the twin security and borrow 16.204
shares of risk-free security. The value of the project is the time-0 value of the CVaR
replicating portfolio plus project’s time-0 cash flow, (20× 5.20833− 16.204)− 104 =
−16.037 that is the same as the buying price of the project obtained from (4.7).
Market Risk Private Risk Current Year One NPV @8%
50% -104 190 71.93
50%
50% -104 170 53.41
75% -104 70 -39.19
50%
25% -104 30 -76.22
PROJECT
Efficient
Inefficient
Decline
Efficient
Inefficient
HIGH
LOW
INVEST
Fig. 9. Decision tree with private uncertainty.
Figures 10 and 11 show the cash flows of project and their corresponding CVaR
values before and after valuation, respectively. Table V shows the portfolio weights as
the result of investing in only securities; solution to the right optimization problem in
(4.7). Table VI shows the portfolio weights by investing in the project and securities;
solution to the left optimization problem in (4.7). The difference between the NPV
of expected returns is zero when the project is valued at -$16.037.
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Fig. 10. Cash flows with CVaR values in partially complete markets before valuation.
Fig. 11. Cash flows with CVaR values in partially complete markets after valuation.
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Table V. Partially complete markets: portfolio weights by investing in only securities.
Weights Expected Return
Security 10.125 243.00
Risk-free security 97.50 105.30
Total 348.30
Table VI. Partially complete markets: portfolio weights by investing in the project
and securities.
Weights Expected Return
Twin security 4.9167 109.26
Risk-free security 113.7037 122.80
Project 1 107.50
Total 348.30
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4. Coherent Valuation Procedure
In this section, we present a valuation procedure called Coherent Valuation Procedure
(CVP) for finding the value of a risky project in partially complete markets. To start
this procedure, first NPV of all end points in the decision tree is calculated, then the
following steps are followed,
1. Upon reaching a node in the decision tree representing a private uncertainty,
replace the node with CVaRt value denoted by φ[.|.];
2. Upon reaching a node in the decision tree representing a market uncertainty,
replace the node with the expected value computed using the risk-neutral prob-
abilities; and
3. Upon reaching a decision node, choose the branch with the maximum value.
Proposition D.3 The time-t value obtained from the coherent valuation procedure
is equal to ct + ϕ˜tst.
Proof By induction. Assuming it is true for t, we prove it for t− 1. The statement
is true for t = T since ϕ˜T = 0. For t− 1 we have,
ct−1 + ϕ˜t−1st−1 = ct−1 + Epi
[
1
1 + rf
ϕ˜t−1st|ωt−1
]
= ct−1 + Epi
[
φ[
1
1 + rf
(ct + ϕ˜tst)|ωmt , ωpt−1]|ωt−1
]
= ct−1 + Epi
[
φ[
1
1 + rf
vt|ωmt , ωpt−1]|ωt−1
]
= vt−1.
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The first equality is by completeness of the project with respect to market uncer-
tainties and the existence of unique risk-neutral probabilities. The second equality is
by the definition of ϕ˜, and the third equality follows from the induction assumption.
Theorem D.4 (Consistency Theorem) If the securities market is partially complete
and the firm’s risk preference is expressed by conditional value at risk, then the firm’s
breakeven buying price for any project is equal to the value given by the coherent
valuation procedure.
Proof Let us assume there exist another project c˜ that is identical to c except for
time-0 cash flow, c˜0 = c0 − v. By Proposition D.3, v˜ = 0 that means the firm is
indifferent between investing in c˜ and a time-0 payment of zero. Therefore, v is the
breakeven buying price of c.
To demonstrate the consistency theorem in partially complete markets, we use 40%-
CVaR for private risk and risk-neutral probabilities for market risk. In this case,
the value obtained for the project from CVP is (170×.4 + 45×.6)/1.08 - 104 = -
16.037, which is equal to the buying price of the project shown in Figures 6 and
7 (-104+87.963= -16.037). Figure 12 depicts different values generated from CVP
for varying values of confidence level. It also demonstrates the values obtained from
integrated valuation procedure (IVP) for a wide range of risk parameter values. As
it can be seen in the picture, while IVP yields a narrow range of values for a wide
range of risk paraments, CVP shows a better degree of sensitivity with respect to
change in α and provides a better picture of project’s inherent risk. Furthermore,
both procedures yield the same maximum and minimum values: when the decision-
maker is risk-neutral, namely the risk parameter in the exponential utility function
converges to +∞ in IVP and α=100% in CVP, both procedures yield the same value
of -4. In this case, the decision-maker does not require a risk premium for the private
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risk cash flows. Also, they both give the solution of -24 as utility function parameter
converges to −∞ and α to 0%.
-26
-24
-22
-20
-18
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280
-26
-24
-22
-20
-18
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Certainty Equivalent
CVaR
Fig. 12. IVP vs. CVP.
E. Discussion
Capital budgeting or making the decision to invest in a risky project by a manger
can expose the firm to a substantial amount of risk. This is particularly important
if the investment under consideration is a large engineering projects and involves a
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significant equity commitment. Traditionally, utility theory and certainty equivalent
have been used to measure and capture risk in gambles that consist of private risks.
However, values obtained from the certainty equivalent of expected utility, namely an
exponential utility function, do not show much sensitivity to the change in the decision
maker’s risk tolerance represented by utility function parameters. Conditional value
at risk is a measure of risk that is used in financial industry to measure downside
risks. Having superior properties compared to VaR, like convexity and subadditivity,
CVaR can be used in the context of a mean-risk model for valuing risky projects from
a perspective of a risk-averse decision-maker without the need for deriving a utility
function and related parameters.
If project’s uncertainties are well defined and can be decomposed into market
and private uncertainties represented by a set of subjective probabilities based on
firm’s past performance or expert option, one can use CVaR as a surrogate for pri-
vate risk and standard risk-neutral probabilities for market risk. While risk-neutral
probabilities can be used to account for market risk, subjective probabilities along
with α percentile are used for valuing private risks. Compared to an exponential
utility function, using CVaR for valuing private risk cash flows results in lower degree
of subjectivity as the only parameter used in deriving the value is α percentile.
A fundamental concept in finance is proportionality of risks and prospective
returns. Without knowing the magnitude of possible losses at different stages of
project development, it would be dangerous if not impractical to evaluate or place an
appropriate value on a risky asset. The valuation procedure presented in this chapter
provides a window of opportunity for the decision-maker to capture and observe the
extreme losses by measuring the downside risks at different points of time, making it
an effective tool for decision-makers in determining the value of risky projets.
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F. Case Study: Dulles Greenway Project in Virginia
In this section, we discuss the application of CVP to valuing a transportation infras-
tructure project that was considered for public-private partnership in Virginia. State
of Virginia is one of the pioneering states in privatizing public infrastructure projects.
The Public Private Transportation Act (PPTA) by Virginia Department of Trans-
portation (VDOT) allows VDOT to collaborate with private sector to develop and/or
operate transportation projects. One of this projects was a toll highway project that
was later named Dulles Greenway by the consortium that developed this project.
1. Project Background
Dulles Greenway project was among the first transportation projects in the U.S. to
be developed through Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) arrangement discussed in
Chapter II. Planning for this project started in 1987 after Virginia General assembly
authorized the project for PPP due to $7 billion budget deficit. Project development
was awarded to a private consortium, allowing them to collect toll on the highway for
40 years. Project background information and estimates discussed in this section are
adopted from [21] and are based on financial report submitted by the consortium to
the state.
According to the initial plan, construction was planned to start in 1989 and
operations in 1992, but due to financing and environmental clearance issues construc-
tion did not start until 1993. However, construction finished ahead of schedule in
September 1995. The consortium’s initial ridership estimates were approximately
20,000 vehicles per day for the first year at the toll rate of $1.5, with projections for
ridership increasing to 34,000 vehicle per day at the same toll rate after three years.
However, in light of optimism over economic development in the area, ridership esti-
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mates revised upward to 34,000 vehicle per day for 1995 and initial toll rate estimate
increased to $2 as project construction started two years after the original date. The
total construction costs were approximately $279 million, of which approximately $40
million was provided by equity investors, and the rest financed with long-term fixed
rate bonds.
Once the highway became operational, the average traffic demand was at a low
rate of 10,500 vehicle per day. Consequently, the toll rate was reduced to $1.00 in
March 1996 and projected toll hikes were postponed to spur demand. Ridership in-
creased to 21,000 daily travelers by 1996; however, the effect on projected revenues
was not substantial as reduced toll rate offset the increase in ridership. As the re-
sult, in summer 1996, project developers started a negotiation process with project
creditors for deferring loan payments and debt restructuring.
2. Analysis
The analysis is based on the following assumptions by developers:
1. Average daily traffic demand will grow at 14% annually for the first six and 7%
per year for the following 34 years.
2. The toll rates begin at $2.00 and by the 15th year of operation, rises to $3.00.
3. Operating expenses start at $9 million per year and grow at 5% per year.
4. Capital improvements include road maintenance and capacity expansion activ-
ities.
The construction and development costs of $279 million are divided over the
two-year construction period, and financing, taxes, depreciation and other costs are
ignored for simplification. To calculate project’s cash flows, capital expenditures
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Table VII. Operating and capital projections.
Period Average daily traffic Toll per vehicle Gross revenue Operating expenses Capital improvement EBIT Capital expenditure
1 -$139,500,000.00
2 -$139,500,000.00
3 $20,000.00 $1.00 $7,300,000.00 $9,000,000.00 -$1,700,000.00
4 $22,800.00 $1.00 $8,322,000.00 $9,450,000.00 -$1,128,000.00
5 $25,992.00 $1.00 $9,487,080.00 $9,922,500.00 -$435,420.00
6 $29,630.88 $1.25 $13,519,089.00 $10,418,625.00 $3,100,464.00
7 $33,779.20 $1.25 $15,411,761.46 $10,939,556.25 $4,472,205.21
8 $38,508.29 $1.50 $21,083,289.68 $11,486,534.06 $9,596,755.61
9 $41,203.87 $1.50 $22,559,119.95 $12,060,860.77 $10,498,259.19
10 $44,088.14 $1.50 $24,138,258.35 $12,663,903.80 -$3,000,000.00 $8,474,354.55
11 $47,174.31 $1.75 $30,132,592.51 $13,297,098.99 $16,835,493.51
12 $50,476.52 $1.75 $32,241,873.98 $13,961,953.94 -$1,700,000.00 $16,579,920.04
13 $54,009.87 $1.75 $34,498,805.16 $14,660,051.64 $19,838,753.52
14 $57,790.56 $2.00 $42,187,110.31 $15,393,054.22 $26,794,056.09
15 $61,835.90 $2.00 $45,140,208.04 $16,162,706.93 $28,977,501.10
16 $66,164.41 $2.00 $48,300,022.60 $16,970,842.28 -$9,400,000.00 $21,929,180.32
17 $70,795.92 $2.25 $58,141,152.20 $17,819,384.39 $40,321,767.81
18 $75,751.64 $2.25 $62,211,032.86 $18,710,353.61 $43,500,679.24
19 $81,054.25 $2.25 $66,565,805.16 $19,645,871.30 $46,919,933.86
20 $86,728.05 $2.50 $79,139,346.13 $20,628,164.86 -$10,400,000.00 $48,111,181.27
21 $92,799.01 $2.50 $84,679,100.36 $21,659,573.10 $63,019,527.26
22 $99,294.95 $2.50 $90,606,637.39 $22,742,551.76 $67,864,085.63
23 $106,245.59 $2.65 $102,766,048.12 $23,879,679.35 $78,886,368.78
24 $113,682.78 $2.65 $109,959,671.49 $25,073,663.31 $84,886,008.18
25 $121,640.58 $2.65 $117,656,848.50 $26,327,346.48 $91,329,502.02
26 $130,155.42 $2.85 $135,394,173.39 $27,643,713.80 $107,750,459.59
27 $139,266.30 $2.85 $144,871,765.53 $29,025,899.49 $115,845,866.04
28 $149,014.94 $2.85 $155,012,789.12 $30,477,194.47 $124,535,594.65
29 $159,445.98 $3.00 $174,593,351.95 $32,001,054.19 $142,592,297.76
30 $170,607.20 $3.00 $186,814,886.59 $33,601,106.90 $153,213,779.69
31 $182,549.71 $3.00 $199,891,928.65 $35,281,162.25 $164,610,766.40
32 $195,328.19 $3.00 $213,884,363.66 $37,045,220.36 $176,839,143.30
33 $209,001.16 $3.00 $228,856,269.11 $38,897,481.38 $189,958,787.73
34 $223,631.24 $3.00 $244,876,207.95 $40,842,355.45 $204,033,852.50
35 $239,285.43 $3.00 $262,017,542.51 $42,884,473.22 $219,133,069.29
36 $256,035.41 $3.00 $280,358,770.48 $45,028,696.88 $235,330,073.60
37 $273,957.89 $3.00 $299,983,884.41 $47,280,131.72 $252,703,752.69
38 $293,134.94 $3.00 $320,982,756.32 $49,644,138.31 $271,338,618.02
39 $313,654.38 $3.00 $343,451,549.27 $52,126,345.22 $291,325,204.04
40 $335,610.19 $3.00 $367,493,157.71 $54,732,662.48 $312,760,495.23
41 $359,102.90 $3.00 $393,217,678.75 $57,469,295.61 $335,748,383.15
42 $384,240.11 $3.00 $420,742,916.27 $60,342,760.39 $360,400,155.88
Present values (@ 8%): $701,670,806.70 $202,782,824.75 -$19,341,587.31 $490,676,822.68 -$248,765,432.10
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including operating expenses and capital improvements are subtracted from annual
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over the 40-year concession period as fol-
lows,
CF = Gross Revenue - Operating Expenses - Capital Improvements,
Gross Revenue = Average Daily Traffic × Average Toll Rate × 365 days.
Operating and capital projections are summarized in Table VII.
3. Valuation
To apply CVP for valuing this project based on the projected data, we must first
identify different types of risks and categorize them into market and private elements.
In this project, the uncertainty in the initial demand is considered a market risk as
the initial traffic is directly tied to property development in the area. Previous studies
[41] also support the strong relationship between GDP growth and traffic demand in
highways. The variation in construction and operating costs are considered as private
uncertainty since it is directly related to the developer’s ability to execute the project
effectively.
Table VIII. Market probabilities.
Return (%) Probability
High 27.509 0.363636
Average 11.522 0.363636
Low -9.716 0.272727
Risk-neutral probabilities for market uncertainties are derived from the S&P 500
index returns between 1960-1992 and are depicted in Figure 13. Table VIII shows
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Fig. 13. S&P 500 returns 1960-1992.
the risk-neutral probabilities for the low, average and high market states.
The summary of analysis is tabulated in Table IX. It shows values for three
different initial demands of 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 vehicle per day that correspond
to low, average and high market states, respectively, and the value obtained under
50%-CVaR. It is assumed that toll price starts at $2 per vehicle if the traffic is high,
and gradually increases to $3 in later years. However, if the demand is below 30,000,
due to price elasticity it is assumed that toll price starts at $1 and is increased to $3
in a longer time frame.
4. Managerial Implications
Despite the positive NPV obtained from the CVP that are between $278,304,176.49
and $338,436,698.87 and are shown in Table X, analysis reveals that the 90%-CVaR of
the project cash flows varies between -$125,884,467.80 to -$186,016,990.18 depending
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Table IX. Valuation.
Initial Traffic Construction and maintenance costs NPV @8% 50%-CVaR
10000 +30% -186,016,990.18
1 -108,924,012.77
-10% -83,226,353.63 -$159,805,377.86
20000 +30% 164,818,413.17
1 241,911,390.58
-10% 267,609,049.71 $191,030,025.49
30000 +30% 740,030,814.83
1 817,123,792.24
-10% 842,821,451.37 $766,242,427.15
Value $304,515,788.81
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on the choice of α values in CVP. A critical factor in determining the viability of a risky
project is the project’s exposure to risk. The exposure to risk can be instrumental
in the investment decision-making by revealing the amount of risk that the firm is
exposed to as the result of investing in this project.
Table X. Value at different α levels.
Market State
1− α Low Average High Value
0.1 -$186,016,990.18 $164,818,413.17 $740,030,814.83 $278,304,176.49
0.2 -$186,016,990.18 $164,818,413.17 $740,030,814.83 $278,304,176.49
0.3 -$186,016,990.18 $164,818,413.17 $740,030,814.83 $278,304,176.49
0.4 -$172,525,719.14 $178,309,684.21 $753,522,085.87 $291,795,447.54
0.5 -$159,805,377.86 $191,030,025.49 $766,242,427.15 $304,515,788.81
0.6 -$151,325,150.35 $199,510,253.00 $774,722,654.66 $312,996,016.33
0.7 -$144,166,516.73 $206,668,886.62 $781,881,288.28 $320,154,649.94
0.8 -$136,548,996.34 $214,286,407.00 $789,498,808.66 $327,772,170.33
0.9 -$130,624,258.27 $220,211,145.08 $795,423,546.74 $333,696,908.41
1 -$125,884,467.80 $224,950,935.55 $800,163,337.21 $338,436,698.87
Exposure to risk cannot be observed through traditional methods like valuation
through a risk-adjusted discount rate. In fact, the main reason behind financial
distress in Dulles Greenway project was due to the inability of the project developers
to absorb the losses incurred in the initial years of the project during the time needed
for the traffic buildup. In discounted cash flow analysis, not only exposure to risk is
not considered in the valuation process, but also the value obtained is very sensitive to
the choice of the discount rate. Small change in the discount rate can spell significant
change in the NPV of the project. This is even more evident for projects that need
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some time to become net cash flow positive. For example, assume a project that
generates no cash flows for 10 years, and then generates $1,000,0000 in the 11th year
is valued and the discount rate of 30% is used. Discounting cash flows at rate of
30% yields a present value of $55,798. Now, if the discount rate increases to 32%,
the present value falls to $47,172. This is more than 15% decline in the value as the
result of 2% increase in the discount rate.
G. Summary
This chapter introduces a valuation approach based on mean-CVaR portfolio opti-
mization in which a risk-averse decision maker seeks to maximize the expected return
subject to downside risk represented by CVaR. We showed that, in complete markets,
the value obtained from this approach is equal to the value obtained from standard
option pricing approach. Furthermore, if project’s uncertainties are well defined and
can be decomposed into market uncertainties and private uncertainties represented
by a set of subjective probabilities based on firm’s past performance or expert option,
project’s value can be determined by Coherent Valuation Procedure in which CVaR
is used as a surrogate for private risk and risk-neutral probabilities for market risk.
We showed that the breakeven buying price of a risky project is equal to the value
obtained from this valuation procedure.
Comparing the values obtained from this approach and Integrated Valuation
Procedure that is based on exponential utility function shows greater sensitivity to
the risk tolerance of the decision-maker represented by the parameter α in α-CVaR. In
addition, CVP captures the decision-maker’s exposure to risk in a more natural way
and without using a utility function. As the risk parameter in the exponential utility
function converges to infinity reflecting the risk neutrality of the decision-maker, the
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value obtained from the IVP approach converges to the value of CVP at α=100% that
represents risk neutrality in CVP. Finally, the application of CVP is demonstrated
through valuing a transportation infrastructure PPP.
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CHAPTER V
RISK-BASED MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION POLICIES∗
A. Introduction
Infrastructure facilities must undergo a number of maintenance and rehabilitation
(M&R) actions throughout their life to maximize their service life. Effective mainte-
nance and rehabilitation planning will significantly lower the total life cycle cost of
an infrastructure facility, and will also provide a consistent level of service for net-
work users. Many transportation agencies across the nation have developed systems
to manage transportation infrastructure assets in a cost-effective and efficient man-
ner. Over the years, a number of models have been developed to determine optimal
M&R policies. In such models, facility’s deterioration is either considered stochas-
tic with the uncertainty incorporated in the deterioration process [11], or assumed
deterministic with future states assumed to be known [46]. Given the impact of un-
certainty on the deterioration process and consequently on the M&R optimal policies,
the objective of this chapter is to develop a modeling framework for determining long-
and short- term policies that take into account the risk associated with deterioration
uncertainty.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section B reviews the related literature
and introduces the required background,. Section C describes the general approach
to risk-based M&R decision making proposed in this paper. It discusses both long-
and short-term models developed. To illustrate the approach, we consider a specific
∗Parts of this chapter are reprinted with permission from Seyedshohadaie, SR.,
Damnjanovic, I., Butenko, S.:Risk-based maintenance and rehabilitation decisions
for transportation infrastructure networks, Transportation Research, Part A. 44(4),
236-248 (2010) c© Elsevier.
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case when risk is defined by pavement deterioration in Section D. In particular, we
provide an analytical expression for the risk function and formulate the corresponding
LP models. These models are analyzed computationally using a sample network of
20 facilities in Section E. Finally, summary and concludes is discussed in Section F.
B. Literature Review
Markov Decision Process (MDP) is the primary modeling framework for determin-
ing the network M&R policies under deterioration uncertainty resulting from differ-
ent M&R actions. State-of-the-art infrastructure management systems involve MDP
models and use dynamic programming techniques to solve for optimal policies. The
application of MDP for pavement maintenance was introduced by Arizona Depart-
ment of Transportation (ADOT) in 1979. Namely, ADOT developed a pavement
management system to improve the allocation of its limited resources. The model is
based on the data from the inspection of the current condition of facilities, as well as
the expectation of the future condition, given an action among a finite set of actions
performed on the facility. A detailed description of the model is presented in [22].
M&R policy optimization approaches based on Markov decision process (MDP)
framework can be found in [11, 19, 23]. In such approaches, facility conditions are
modeled as discrete states and the deterioration process is represented by discrete-
time transitional probabilities. The Markovian assumption implies that the condition
of the facility at time t + 1 depends only on the condition at time t and the action
applied to the facility at time t. The optimization model seeks to find minimum cost
M&R policy that is a mapping from a set of actions to the set of possible states.
Madant and Ben-Akiva [38] and Madanat [37] introduced the latent Markov deci-
sion process (LMDP) to account for uncertainly in the current measurement of the
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facility. Mbwana and Turnquist [43] presented a network-level optimization model
based on MDP for pavement management systems with suggestions for the short-
term allocation of resources. Guignier and Madanat [25] presented a model for joint
optimization of the M&R and improvement policies in a network of infrastructure
facilities. Smilowitz and Madanat [58] extended the LMDP model to policies that
include network level constraints. Guillaumot et al. [26] combined this model with
inspection decisions and presented an adaptive optimization approach to find optimal
policies under model uncertainty. A common way of solving such models is by trans-
forming the infinite-time horizon MDP into a linear programming (LP) model, for
which efficient algorithms exist. A problem arises when this approach is implemented
on the network level in finite-time horizon and under short-term budget restriction.
Dynamic programming (DP) is the common approach to optimize MDP in the fi-
nite horizon. Adding the budget constraint will result in exponential increase in the
number of state variables, making it computationally expensive to solve the model
to optimality. Kuhn [31] introduced approximate dynamic programming approach
to obtain close to optimal solution for this problem. Therefore, efficient models are
needed to address the resource allocation problem.
Another approach to modeling M&R policies is the optimal control framework
with continuous maintenance actions and states. The objective of such models is to
minimize the total life-cycle costs over a specific time horizon. Tsunokawa and Schofer
[62] introduced an optimal control approach to approximate the optimal timing and
intensity of maintenance actions. Li and Madanat [35] presented optimal polices
under steady-state condition, and Ouyang and Madant [46] provided the exact and
approximate rehabilitation intensity and frequency solution approaches assuming fi-
nite horizon and deterministic deterioration. Jido et al. [29] used optimal impulse
control to solve for optimal repair and inspection policies.
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In other proposed methodologies for M&R planning, Durango-Cohen [16] treated
deterioration in a time series framework to integrate performance prediction and M&R
decision making, Chootinana et al. [12] used a simulation-based genetic algorithm to
solve pavement maintenance problem under stochastic deterioration , Ying et al. [64]
assumed deterministic model parameters and derived required amount of investment
to maintain or improve levels of service for a highway network based on the user
equilibrium.
1. Deterioration Uncertainty
Deterioration of transportation infrastructure is a complex process. For example,
environmental factors and traffic load are two key factors in the pavement rough-
ness deterioration and are associated with high level of uncertainty and high variance
among observations. In MDP-based models, the deterioration process is represented
by transitional probabilities. Two common approaches to estimate transitional prob-
abilities are by expert opinion or from empirical data. Both approaches can result
in transitional probabilities with high variance in the distributions of future states.
Additionally, not all facilities within a given network may have the same transitional
probabilities under the same M&R action. In most cases, transitional probabilities
should be updated and checked through inspection when the true state of the facilities
are revealed.
Several works in the literature specifically address the uncertainty in the pave-
ment performance model. Li et al. [34] discussed the importance of accurate predic-
tion of pavement deterioration in the determination of pavement M&R intensity and
frequency policies and presented a nonhomogeneous MDP to determine pavement
deterioration rates in different stages. Harper and Majidzadeh [28] used Bayesian
strategies to update the parameters of the deterioration model. Kuhn and Mdanat
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[32] proposed robust optimization models to obtain policies that are valid for a collec-
tion of transitional probabilities. Damnjanovic and Zhang [14] presented a reliability
model to predict the pavement performance under uncertain conditions. Durango-
Cohen and Madanat [17] introduced an optimal control model, where the uncertainty
in the deterioration model is represented by a probability mass function of deteri-
oration rates. In this model, the probability mass function of deterioration rate is
updated to increase deterioration rate accuracy. Madanat et al. [39] proposed an
open-loop feedback control model, in which model parameters are updated sequen-
tially after every inspection round. Durango-Cohen and Madanat [18] assumed de-
terioration as an unknown mixture of known performance models taken from a finite
set of performance models and presented an optimization model to find joint inspec-
tion and maintenance polices. Chu and Durango-Cohen [13] used time series analysis
techniques to determine pavement performance model. Deterioration is commonly
modeled as an exponential function of time. For pavement roughness, the typical
deterministic roughness deterioration model is the following model that is discussed
in [35] and [46]:
s = s0 exp (ξτ). (5.1)
In this function, ξ is the deterioration parameter; s0 and s are the roughness at the
beginning and the end of the planning horizon, respectively, and τ := t− t0, t > t0 is
the length of the planning horizon [t0, t]. Assuming that the deterioration parameter
ξ is random, the deterioration model in (5.1) provides a more realistic description
of the deterioration process. Considering a normally distributed ξ ∼ N(µ, σ2), the
random variable η = s/s0 has a lognormal probability density function:
pη(y) =
1
yτσ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(ln(y)− τµ)
2
2(τσ)2
)
. (5.2)
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We would like to utilize a quantitative measure of risk to manage the uncertainty
in the deterioration process. This quantitative measure is essential in both finding the
optimal steady-state polices that minimize the long-term cost of the network M&R
actions and in the short-term budget allocation. The purpose of the next subsection
is to introduce and define such measure of risk.
2. Risk-based Resource Allocation
Consider a network of M facilities with m = 1, .., F being the index set of facilities,
and define xm to be the decision variable representing the amount of resources allo-
cated to facility m. Denote by fm(xm, ξm) the loss function associated with decision
variable xm and the random variable ξm representing the uncertain condition state of
the facility k after the resource allocation action. The probability density function of
ξm is assumed to be pξm(·). For a fixed xm, the probability that fm(xm, ξm) does not
exceed threshold ζ is given by [52]:
Ψm(xm, ζ) =
∫
fm(xm,y)≤ζ
pξm(y)dy. (5.3)
As a function of ζ, Ψm(xm, ζ) is the cumulative distribution function for the loss
associated with xm and is nondecreasing and assumed to be everywhere continuous
on ζ. The α-VaR and α-CVaR for facility k and the loss random variable associated
with xm and any probability level α ∈ (0, 1) are denoted by ζα(xm) and φα(xm),
respectively, and are given by
ζα(xm) = min{ζ ∈ R : Ψm(xm, ζ) ≥ α}, (5.4)
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φα(xm) = (1− α)−1
∫
fm(xm,y)≥ζα(xm)
fm(xm, y)pξm(y)dy. (5.5)
In order to use (5.5) to calculate α-CVaR for each facility, the probability distribution
of states at the end of the planning horizon must be determined. In some cases, when
the probability distribution of deterioration function is known, closed form solutions
to calculate the α-CVaR in the planning horizon can be derived. In particular, as will
be shown in Section D, this is the case for lognormal distribution used in our model
to describe the roughness deterioration process. On the other hand, if the probability
distribution of deterioration function is not known or such that its α-CVaR cannot
be computed analytically, it can be approximated using Monte Carlo simulation. The
reader is referred to [53] for a detailed discussion on mathematical foundations behind
the concept of CVaR for general loss distributions.
C. Risk-based M&R Decisions
By using the quantitative risk measure described in the previous section, optimal
M&R policies that will satisfy a certain level of risk can be determined in both
long- and short- term bases. Long-term decisions are needed for the budget planning
process, in which the total long-term budget is determined for facilities with initial
conditions satisfying the risk level whereas short-term decisions are needed to allo-
cate resources under budget constraints. Figure 14 describes the overall approach to
determining risk-based M&R actions for both long- and short- term decisions using
CVaR as the measure of risk. First, the distribution of future states in the planning
horizon under each M&R action is determined for facilities with conditions below the
risk threshold. Then, from these distributions, the actions that satisfy the CVaR
level with their corresponding transitional probabilities are derived. Based on this
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data, the long-term model produces the steady-state risk-averse solution assuming
no budget constraints. This solution is the optimal risk-averse action for keeping the
facility at the preset risk level within the planning horizon. The state-action mapping
obtained from the long-term model is only applied to facilities that are not in failed
condition i.e. they are not deteriorated beyond the risk level. At any given year, the
transportation agency reviews the facilities that are due for M&R action and if there
is a budget shortage for implementing optimal actions, a resource allocation decision
is made by solving one of the short-term models. Short-term models are deployed to
allocate resources among all facilities that are set for M&R action including the ones
that are deteriorated beyond the risk level. Each model will be discussed in greater
detail in the remainder of this section.
1. Long-term Risk-averse Decisions
Transportation agencies are interested in policies that maintain the network quality
at an acceptable level and are in accordance with their long-term budget projections.
Developing long-term M&R policies is the initial step towards this objective.
The proposed risk-based long-term M&R optimization model is formulated in
the MDP framework. A Markov Decision Process can be described by a tuple
(S, A,Pa(·, ·), Ca(·)), where S = {1, . . . , K} is the finite state space, A = {1, . . . , N}
is the finite action space. Pa(i, j) is the probability that action a in state i at time
t will lead to state j at time t + 1. Ca(i) is the cost obtained as a result of applying
action a in state i. The objective of most MDP-based models in the literature is to
minimize the total cost that consists of both agency and user costs. While user cost
can be included in the model, we are specifically seeking the policies that constrain
certain risk in the performance indicator. In this model, instead of seeking a com-
promise between user cost and agency cost, optimal M&R decisions are generated
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based on the predefined performance level under risk to avoid the subjectivity that
user cost brings to the model.
To develop the optimization model, two main inputs in the MDP must be mod-
ified. First, the action set must only consist of actions that always satisfy the pre-
specified level of risk. Second, the transitional probabilities corresponding to the
actions in the action set should be computed by discretizing the probability distribu-
tion of the future condition resulting from applying a given action.
2. Risk-averse Actions
To construct a feasible risk-averse action set, the action set is first filtered against
the targeted risk level starting from the worst initial state to ensure the targeted risk
level is achievable. Then for each initial state and action, actions that satisfy the risk
level are determined by the following steps:
1. Derive (or simulate) the distribution of future states;
2. Calculate the α− CV aR for the corresponding risk function distribution; and
3. Check the α− CV aR against the targeted risk level.
Depending on the initial condition, each action will have a different cost due to
different M&R intensity required to satisfy the risk constraints. The new action set
A′ includes actions that range from the minimum M&R intensity that will satisfy
the risk requirement, to the maximum feasible M&R intensity. Finally, from the
distribution of facility conditions with an initial state under application of M&R
actions, for each initial state the corresponding transitional probabilities and cost of
action are computed.
The optimal risk-averse policies can be obtained by solving the MDP with the
new transitional probabilities for risk-averse actions. If the distribution of facility con-
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dition under different M&R actions is continuous, the state-space must be discretized
by a finite grid approximation to solve the model under the MDP framework.
In the next section, a linear programming formulation of MDP for the long-term
steady-state risk-averse policies is presented.
3. Long-term Model Formulation
Let St, t = 0, 1, . . ., denote the random variables representing initial state of the
facility at time t. We assume the following Markov property:
Pa(i, j) = P(St+1 = j|St = i, At = a) = P(St+1 = j|St = i, At = a, St−1).
Let vni (piα) be the value function corresponding to the discounted expected cost of the
facility with initial state i ∈ S, over n periods under the risk-averse policy piα where α
represents the confidence level used in α-CVaR. If the facility is in state i then ai(piα)
is the risk-averse action applied in state i according to the risk-averse policy piα. To
simplify the notation, we will write piα instead of ai(piα) whenever it is clear that the
policy piα is applied at state i. We will also write piα ∈ A′ instead of ai(piα) ∈ A′ in
such cases. Let Ci(piα) be the cost of risk-averse M&R policy piα in state i and let
0 ≤ λ < 1 be the discount factor. Then the value function is given by
vni (piα) = Ci(piα) + λ
∑
j∈S
vn−1j (piα)Ppiα(i, j) (5.6)
We assume that the value function is bounded and non-increasing, lim
n→∞
vni (pi) =
vi(pi) exist and under any stationary policy the resulting Markov chain is irreducible.
In a stationary infinite-horizon MDP, the steady-state probabilities are independent
of the initial states and the steady-state value function for a policy piα is defined
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by [48]
vi(piα) = Ci(piα) + λ
∑
j∈S
vj(piα)Ppiα(i, j), (5.7)
and the long-term optimal solution pi∗α can be derived from
ai(pi
∗
α) = arg min
piα
[
Ci(piα) + λ
∑
j∈S
vj(piα)Ppiα(i, j)
]
. (5.8)
Let v∗i = vi(pi
∗
α) denote the optimal value of the value function for state i.
One of the standard methods used for solving reasonably large instances of dis-
counted MDP (5.8) is by conversion to linear programming. The derivation of the
corresponding linear programming formulation of the discounted MDP is described
in detail in [48] and is only briefly sketched here. Denote by γj, j ∈ S the probability
of starting from initial state j and by vj the variable representing the value at state
j. Then the optimal value function magnitude for state j, v∗j , is the solution to the
following linear programming formulation:
max
∑
j∈S
γjvj (5.9)
subject to
vi − λ
∑
j∈S
Ppiα(i, j)vj ≤ Ci(piα), piα ∈ A′, i ∈ S (5.10)
vi ≥ 0, i ∈ S. (5.11)
Let ω(i, aα) be the dual decision variable corresponding to (5.10), then the opti-
mal policy can be derived from the solution of the following linear program, which is
the dual of (5.9)-(5.11):
min
∑
i∈S
∑
piα∈A′
Ci(piα)ω(i, piα) (5.12)
79
subject to
∑
piα∈A′
ω(j, piα)− λ
∑
i∈S
∑
piα∈A′
Ppiα(i, j)ω(i, piα) ≥ γj, j ∈ S, (5.13)
ω(i, piα) ≥ 0, i ∈ S, piα ∈ A′. (5.14)
The optimal solution ω∗(i, piα) is the fraction of periods during which facility is
in state i and action piα is taken. [48, p.228] shows that for any positive choice of
γj, j ∈ S, the resulting linear programs have the same optimal basis. Moreover,
the dual optimal solution is equivalent to the optimal deterministic policy for the
discounted MDP as follows. For every i ∈ S and piα ∈ A′, there exist only one
positive ω(i, piα) in the optimal solution of (5.12)-(5.13), meaning there is only one
optimal action for each state in the optimal policy pi∗α.
The accuracy of the solution generated by the model highly depends on the ac-
curacy of the deterioration process description. To ensure the accuracy and precision
of the input parameters like transitional probabilities representing the deterioration
model, a feedback control mechanism as in [39] can be applied to update the dete-
rioration model or model parameter(s) from the realized value of random variables
obtained through inspection.
4. Short-term Model Formulation
While facilities can be in a good condition in the steady state, in the short term, there
may be facilities with a poor condition that require intensive M&R. The resource re-
quired to apply these actions in most cases exceeds the available annual or short-term
budget. In such cases, the transportation agency has to make short-term resource
allocation decisions. Either resources should be assigned fully to some facilities while
M&R actions is deprived to others, or resources should be distributed among facilities
80
to attain a lower quality variation across all facilities in the network. The short-term
models presented here are based on the linear expression of CVaR as a function of
the decision variables. In particular, in case of the risk function based on pavement
roughness deterioration, we will establish such linear dependence analytically (see
section 4). In case the linear dependence cannot be established analytically, a linear
approximation of the CVaR can be used as follows. First, the CVaR level that can
be achieved under each action (or M&R intensity) is calculated from the correspond-
ing distribution. Then, CVaR approximation function can be obtained from linear
or polynomial fitting of these discrete points. Figure 15 depicts such a procedure.
Each distribution is the density of facility’s condition at the end of planning horizon
resulting from applying different intensity M&R actions. The linear approximation
of CVaR is obtained from the CVaR values at each distribution.
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Fig. 15. CVaR approximation.
81
Denote by Lm(xm) the linear approximation of the short-term CVaR for facility
m, where xm is the budget allocated to facility m. Let BT be the annual budget
available to the agency and LBm and UBm be the lower and upper bound of budget
allocated to facility m, respectively. Denote by Cmα (xm) the α-CVaR corresponding to
facility m and by Cα the variable representing the upper bound on the CVaR of each
facility in the network. We will use the linear approximation Lm(xm) to represent
Cmα (xm), i.e., we assume that
Lm(xm) = Cmα (xm), m ∈ F,
where F ⊂ {1, . . . ,M} is the subset of facilities in the network that require M&R.
The model in (5.15)-(5.15c) below is the minimax model formulation to minimize the
largest CVaR among all facilities in the network. We call this model MIN-MAX-
CVaR.
minCα (5.15)
subject to
Lm(xm) ≤ Cα, m ∈ F, (5.16)∑
m∈F
xm ≤ BT , (5.17)
LBm ≤ xm ≤ UBm, m ∈ F. (5.18)
Here constraint (5.15a) provides an upper bound on the highest CVaR of a facility
in the network, (5.15b) limits the total budget by BT , and constraint (5.15c) bounds
allocation to each facility within the lower and upper bound limits.
The second, alternative model written in (5.19)-(5.19b) below has the objective of
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minimizing the sum of CVaR over all facilities. We call this model MIN-SUM-CVaR:
min
∑
m∈F
Lm(xm) (5.19)
subject to ∑
i∈F
xm ≤ BT , (5.20)
LBm ≤ xm ≤ UBm, m ∈ F. (5.21)
The constraints in this model are the same as (5.17)-(5.18). Next, the general models
presented in this section are illustrated for a specific setting.
D. Network Rehabilitation Models with Risk Defined by Pavement Deterioration
To apply the proposed methodology for network rehabilitation decisions, we will uti-
lize the stochastic deterioration model (5.1) in combination with the continuous pave-
ment state model proposed by Ouyang and Madanat [46] for overlay and roughness
improvement. The possible actions will be associated with the thickness of pavement
overlay applied to the facility. The risk in this case will be defined as the facility’s
pavement roughness, and for a fixed overlay thickness the corresponding risk function
will be given by the stochastic roughness deterioration model (5.1). Therefore, the
risk function will have a lognormal distribution for each action. As will be shown
below, the risk function’s CVaR will depend linearly on the decision variable wm
representing the overlay thickness. This will allow us to write linear programming
formulations for both MIN-MAX-CVaR and MIN-SUM-CVaR models. We describe
the model in detail in the following subsections.
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1. Continuous Pavement State Model
The following model was proposed by Ouyang and madanat [46] for overlay and
roughness improvement. Let G(wm, s
0
m) denote the roughness improvement after
applying wm mm of overlay on the pavement of facility m with s
0
m as the initial
roughness, then
G(wm, s
0
m) =
g1wm
g2 + g3/s0m
, (5.22)
where wm ≤ g2s0m + g3, (5.23)
g1 = 0.66, g2 = 0.55, g3 = 18.3.
The corresponding agency cost function is given by
M(wm) = m1wm +m2, (5.24)
m1 = 3, 000, m2 = 150, 000.
Given the initial roughness s0m, this model can be used to relate the desired roughness
s1m of the facility after applying the overlay to the thickness of overlay. Namely, we
obtain the following linear relationship:
s1m = s
0
m −
g1wm
g2 + g3/s0m
. (5.25)
2. The Risk Function and Its CVaR
We will define the risk function fm(s
1
m, ξm) for facility m according to the stochastic
deterioration model (5.1) as follows:
fm(s
1
m, ξm) = s
1
m exp(ξmτ),
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where s1m represents the roughness after M&R action (which we treat as the initial
condition in this case) and ξm ∼ N(µm, σ2m). Hence ηm = fm(s1m, ξm)/s1m has the
lognormal probability density function
pηm(y) =
1
yτσm
√
2pi
exp
(
−(ln(y)− τµm)
2
2(τσm)2
)
. (5.26)
Let
Fηm(y) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
ln(y)− µmτ
σmτ
√
2
)
be the cumulative distribution function of ηm, and let ζα and φα be the α-VaR and
α-CVaR for ηm, respectively. We have
ζα = F
−1
ηm (α) = exp(τµm +
√
2τσmerf
−1(2α− 1)). (5.27)
Using the definition (5.5) of CVaR and equation (5.27) for ζα, we obtain:
φα =
1
(1−α)
1
τσm
√
2pi
∞∫
ζα(xm)
exp
(
− (ln(y)−τµm)2
2(τmσm)2
)
dy
= 1
(1−α) exp
(
τµm +
(τσm)2
2
)
Φ
(
− ln(ζα(xm))+τµm+(τσm)2
τσm
)
= 1
(1−α) exp
(
τµm +
(τσm)2
2
)
Φ
(−√2erf−1(2α− 1) + τσm) ,
(5.28)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Since fm(s
1
m, ξm) = ηms
1
m, the α-CVaR φ
f
α(s
1
m) for the loss function fm is calculated
by the following equation:
φfα(s
1
m) = s
1
mφα(xm) =
s1m
(1− α) exp
(
τµm +
(τσm)
2
2
)
Φ
(
−
√
2erf−1(2α− 1) + τσm
)
.
(5.29)
This formula can be used to calculate the required initial condition to guarantee a
performance measure for pavement performance (e.g., roughness) under certain level
of risk. For example, if ξm ∼ N(.05, .01) and τ = 10, to achieve 95%-CVaR = 50
(lower number represents a better roughness level), the initial condition resulting from
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M&R action should be s1m ≤ 502.028 = 24.65.
3. Short-term Models
Let us introduce the following notation:
k(µi, σi, τ, α) =
1
(1− α) exp
(
τµi +
(τσi)
2
2
)
Φ
(
−
√
2erf−1(2α− 1) + τσi
)
Note that k(µi, σi, τ, α) does not depend on the decision variables, which are given
by the overlay thickness wi, i ∈ F for each facility and the largest α-CVaR Cα of a
facility in the network. Summarizing the equations in the previous subsections, we
obtain the following LP model for MIN-MAX-CVaR:
minCα (5.30)
subject to (
s0m −
0.66wm
0.55 + 18.3/s0m
)
k(µm, σm, τ, α) ≤ Cα, m ∈ F, (5.31)∑
m∈F
(3, 000wm + 150, 000) ≤ BT , (5.32)
10 ≤ wm ≤ 0.55s0m + 18.3. (5.33)
Similarly, the MIN-SUM-CVaR model is given by:
min
∑
i∈F
(
s0m −
0.66wm
0.55 + 18.3/s0m
)
k(µm, σm, τ, α) (5.34)
subject to ∑
m∈F
(3, 000wm + 150, 000) ≤ BT , (5.35)
10 ≤ wm ≤ 0.55s0m + 18.3. (5.36)
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E. Numerical Study
We consider a network of 20 facilities with different initial conditions for the numerical
study. The network is depicted in Figure 16. The number on each link represents
the initial roughness of the facility. We first derive the long-term steady-state policy
for facilities that are within the state-space with no budget restriction and then use
short-term models with budget restriction assuming all facilities require rehabilitation
action. Note that there are facilities with failed condition in the network (their
condition is outside of the state-space and require maximum rehabilitation) that we
would like to rehabilitate along with facilities in normal condition. The deterioration
parameter ξm is assumed to be a random variable normally distributed with µm = .05
and σm = .01 for all facilities m = 1, . . . , 20. First, we obtain the long-term risk-averse
rehabilitation policies that satisfy the 90%-CVaR level of 45 QI (QI is the index of
pavement roughness). The state-space is a grid of 10 discrete points in the interval
[5, 50]. For each roughness level, the distribution of deterioration rate and, hence,
distribution of roughness in the 10-year planning horizon is constructed by using the
formulas in (5.2). Figure 17 illustrates the distribution of facility’s deterioration rate
s/s0 with µ = .05 and σ = .01 for the 10 year time horizons relative to 1 and 20
year time horizons. As Figure 17 shows, the deterioration rates widen for longer time
frames. The increase in deterioration rate variance highlights the importance of risk
management for M&R actions with longer time frame.
1. Long-term Model Solution
For numerical computations, three actions are considered in the action set. The
actions are assumed to be the minimum (min), medium (mid) and maximum (max)
intensity rehabilitation. The minimum rehabilitation action is the one that satisfies
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Fig. 16. Network of pavement facilities.
1 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.1
S/S0 (τ = 1)
1 1.5 2 2.5
S/S0 (τ = 10)
1 2 3 4 5
S/S0 (τ = 20)
Fig. 17. Deterioration distributions.
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CVaR with a minimum cost and, depending on the initial state, will be different;
the maximum rehabilitation action is the maximum rehabilitation possible, and the
medium rehabilitation is considered to be the average of min and max actions. The
transitional probabilities for each of these actions along with the cost of actions at
each state are generated. The transitional probabilities can be found in Table XIII
in Appendix A.
Table XI shows the cost of action in each state and optimal long-term risk-
averse rehabilitation actions, respectively, that are obtained by solving the long-term
model (5.12)-(5.14). The cost of action is different for each state since the minimum
rehabilitation intensity to satisfy the targeted risk level will be different (zero cost
indicates no action). The solution yields the expected required budget of $144339.7
for the planning horizon. This solution only applies to facilities with initial condition
within the [5, 50] range. The results show an increase in rehabilitation intensity
with increase in initial condition. Maximum rehabilitation rolls back the facility to
the state that requires no action to achieve the targeted risk level (lower number
represents a better roughness level).
Table XI. Cost of action and optimal steady-state solution
Action/State 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Min 0 0 0 0 165000 189000 210000 231000 249000 264000
Mid 183000 186000 190500 195000 207000 222000 237000 252000 265500 276000
Max 216000 222000 231000 240000 249000 255000 264000 273000 282000 288000
Optimal Solution Min Min Min Min Max Max Max Max Max Max
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2. Short-term Models Solution
The time frame assumed for short-term CVaR approximation is 2-year. Table XII
summarizes the comparison of the results that each short-term model generated on
the test network of 20 pavement links with various initial conditions. The budget is
limited to $4.5 million, which is below the required budget to maintain the network
at 45 QI. The table shows the initial condition of each facility along with CVaR
resulting from applying the solution obtained from the two models. In the MIN-
SUM-CVaR solution, there are few facilities with a very poor quality, while in the
MIN-MAX-CVaR solution all facilities’ quality is bounded by 59.72, which results in
a slightly higher total sum of CVaR. Comparison of the standard deviations of the
two solutions suggests a much better distribution of facility quality in the MIN-MAX-
CVaR solution.
The results from two short-term models show that narrowing the quality gap
or reducing the CVaR variance can provide more consistency in pavement condition
across the network with the slightly lower total quality level. Comparing the results
from MIN-MAX-CVaR and MIN-SUM-CVaR models clearly indicates the advantage
of the MIN-MAX-CVaR model, since the small improvement in total network quality
that the MIN-SUM-CVaR model offers does not justify the high variance in the
facility’s quality level across the network. Figure 18 compares the computed CVaR
of facilities under the solutions obtained from the two models.
F. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a general methodology for determining optimal risk-
based maintenance and rehabilitation (M&R) policies for transportation infrastruc-
ture that utilizes the CVaR risk measure. The approach enables network M&R plan-
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Table XII. Results of the short-term models
Min-Sum-CVaR Min-Max-CVaR
m Initial Condition wm Cost CVaR wm Cost CVaR
1 40 10 180000 38.29 10 180000 38.29
2 25 10 180000 22.72 10 180000 22.72
3 25 10 180000 22.72 10 180000 22.72
4 44 10 180000 42.55 10 180000 42.55
5 25 10 180000 22.72 10 180000 22.72
6 45 10 180000 43.61 10 180000 43.61
7 60 10 180000 59.85 10.1463 180439 59.72
8 70 10 180000 70.82 21.9236 215771 59.72
9 65 10 180000 65.32 16.1674 198502 59.72
10 45 10 180000 43.61 10 180000 43.61
11 60 10 180000 59.85 10.1463 180439 59.72
12 55 10 180000 54.40 10 180000 54.40
13 48 10 180000 46.83 10 180000 46.83
14 30 10 180000 27.83 10 180000 27.83
15 95 15.55 196650 92.93 48.1948 294584 59.72
16 25 10 180000 22.72 10 180000 22.72
17 100 73.3 369900 38.92 53.1228 309368 59.72
18 120 84.3 402900 46.70 72.2002 366601 59.72
19 115 81.55 394650 44.76 67.5095 352528 59.72
20 140 95.3 435900 54.49 90.5889 421767 59.72
SUM 4500000 921.64 4499999 925.48
Standard Deviation 18.28 15.12
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Fig. 18. Expected CVaR after applying short-term solutions.
ners to determine optimal policies that guarantee a certain performance level and can
be used effectively in a wide variety of situations, such as ensuring safety and security
of certain critical infrastructure facilities. It can also be used as a measure to define
a level of service for network users or simply as a means to solicit adequate level of
funding from the corresponding authorities. Furthermore, this approach can be used
to make network-level short-term resource allocation decisions when resources are not
sufficient to implement long-term policies.
The long-term model is constructed in the MDP framework to minimize the cost
of network M&R actions such that a certain level for a given performance indicator
is guaranteed. The risk-averse actions and transitional probabilities for the MDP
are constructed from the probability distribution of facility at the end of planning
horizon. Two short-term models that are used to make resource allocation decisions
are presented: the MIN-MAX-CVaR model minimizes the highest CVaR over all
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facilities, and the MIN-SUM-CVaR model minimizes the sum of CVaR of all facilities
subject to the budget restrictions.
As an example of application of the proposed methodology, we presented a
method of finding risk-averse rehabilitation policies for networks of transportation
infrastructure under deterioration uncertainty. The numerical results on short-term
rehabilitation decisions from two models show that the first model generates a solution
with a lower variance across the network roughness levels, but with slightly higher
sum of CVaR for roughness for all facilities. Meanwhile, the second model gives a
solution with a high roughness variance among the facilities, but with the sum of
CVaR that is smaller compared to the first model. In other words, risk-averse deci-
sion makers emphasize fairness in budget allocation by using the MIN-MAX-CVaR
model in which all links in the network are considered equally important, while by
using the MIN-SUM-CVaR model, decision makers emphasize cost effectiveness.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this dissertation research is to model risk in delivery, operation and main-
tenance phases of infrastructure asset management. Infrastructure asset management
is a decision-making framework that is founded on economics as well as engineering
principles to maintain infrastructure assets in a efficient and reliable way. This dis-
sertation presents a valuation approach for large-scale engineering projects and a
framework for risk-based maintenance and rehabilitation resource allocation.
Chapter I discusses the arrangement between private and public entities to own
and operate infrastructure assets and the benefits of private sector involvement in
asset management. In addition, potential risks in privatizing these assets are de-
scribed and public-private partnerships, their benefits and common arrangements in
transportation infrastructure are discussed. An important part of privatizing infras-
tructure assets is project valuation process that includes identifying and quantifying
project risks. Similar to any other risky asset, the value of an infrastructure project
is proportional to its underlying risks and prospective return. Infrastructure projects
are capital intensive and require significant investment, but at the same time they
cannot be traded in open markets. The large-scale and non-traded nature of infras-
tructure projects require special consideration in valuing such assets. One of the
challenges arising in the valuing risky assets stems from uncertainties that are unique
to the project.
Further, in Chapter II, maintenance and rehabilitation of infrastructure facili-
ties are discussed. Infrastructure facilities must undergo a number of M&R actions
throughout their life to maximize their service lives. Effective maintenance and re-
habilitation planning not only significantly lowers the total life cycle cost of an in-
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frastructure facility, but also provide a consistent level of service for users. Many
transportation agencies across the nation have developed systems to manage trans-
portation infrastructure assets in a cost-effective and efficient manner. However,
finding optimal network-level M&R policies is challenging because of uncertain dete-
rioration of infrastructure facilities and resource limitations.
Chapter III presents a formal definition of risk along with standard risk manage-
ment practices. Expected utility and certainty equivalent as traditional measures of
risk as well as coherent risk measures are discussed. Definition of coherent risk mea-
sures and Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk as two widely used measure
of downside risks for financial risk management are described. As a convex measure
of risk, CVaR can be represented with linear constraints in a convex optimization
model.
Chapter IV introduces a valuation approach based on mean-CVaR portfolio opti-
mization in which a risk-averse decision-maker seeks to maximize the expected return
subject to downside risk represented by CVaR. We showed that, in complete markets,
the value obtained from this approach is equal to the value obtained from standard
option pricing. Further, if project’s uncertainties are well defined and can be decom-
posed into market uncertainties and private uncertainties that are represented by a
set of subjective probabilities based on firm’s past performance or expert opinion, one
can use CVaR as a surrogate for private risk and standard option pricing methods
for market risk. The risk-neutral probabilities are needed to manage market risks
and subjective probabilities along with a α percentile for valuing private risks. We
introduce the Coherent Valuation Procedure for valuing risky projects in partially
complete markets and show that the breakeven buying price of a risky project is
equal to the value obtained from this valuation procedure.
Compared to an exponential utility function, using CVaR for valuing private
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risk cash flows results in lower degree of subjectivity as the only parameter used in
deriving the value is the confidence level. The range of values obtained in this way
shows a greater sensitivity to change in decision-maker’s risk tolerance represented
by confidence level. In addition, CVP captures decision-maker’s exposure to risk in
a more natural way and without using a utility function.Further, the application of
CVP on valuing a transportation infrastructure PPP is presented in Chapter IV.
On the other hand, compared to traditional discounted cash flow analysis that
uses risk-adjusted rate of return for discounting cash flows, CVP displays a lower
degree of sensitivity to change in discount rate as only risk-free rate is used to discount
cash flows.
Chapter V presents a risk-based framework for prescribing long- and short- term
resource allocation decisions for infrastructure networks as the uncertainty in the
deterioration process will result in uncertain condition of the facilities in the planning
period after applying M&R action. In this chapter, a Markov decision process based
model with filtered action space to generate long-term M&R actions for each condition
state that satisfy a risk threshold is presented. In addition, by using a convex risk
measure, we demonstrate easy to implement short-term resource allocation models
that can be used to incorporate fairness and cost effectiveness in the decision making
process.
The long-term model is constructed in the MDP framework to minimize the cost
of network M&R actions such that a certain level for a given performance indicator
is guaranteed. The risk-averse actions and transitional probabilities for the MDP are
constructed from the probability distribution of a facility at the end of planning hori-
zon. Two short-term models are proposed to generate resource allocation decisions:
the MIN-MAX-CVaR model that minimizes the highest CVaR over all facilities, and
the MIN-SUM-CVaR model that minimizes the sum of CVaR of all facilities subject
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to the budget restrictions.
As an example of application of the proposed methodology in Chapter V, we
present a method of finding risk-averse rehabilitation policies for networks of trans-
portation infrastructure under deterioration uncertainty. The numerical results on
short-term rehabilitation decisions from two models show that the first model gener-
ates a solution with a lower variance across the network roughness levels, but with
slightly higher sum of CVaR for roughness for all facilities. Meanwhile, the sec-
ond model gives a solution with a high roughness variance among the facilities, but
with the sum of CVaR that is smaller compared to the first model. In other words,
risk-averse decision makers emphasize fairness in budget allocation by using the MIN-
MAX-CVaR model in which all links in the network are considered equally important,
while by using the MIN-SUM-CVaR model, decision makers emphasize cost effective-
ness.
A. Future Research Directions
There are several avenues of future research for the problems investigated in this
dissertation. As discussed in Chapter IV, due to large-scale and special nature of
infrastructure projects, namely, the existence of private risks or project specific risks,
placing an appropriate value on these projects is a challenging task. A possible future
research direction would be to investigate and compare the application of various risk
measures in quantifying such risks.
A natural extension to the results presented in Chapter IV is to generalize the
separation results presented for complete markets, to the case of partially complete
markets. In partially complete markets, since project’s cash flows will not be fully
replicated with CVaR replicating portfolio, a rebalancing term is needed for adjusting
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the portfolio weights at each time period.
In addition, when there is competition among private bidders to enter into a
certain partnership, each private party has to submit a proposal based on its private
valuation with the complete/incomplete information of other bidder’s risk consid-
erations. Determining the optimal bid amount given that the other bidder’s risk
tolerances are known is another interesting research direction.
Furthermore, the results presented in Chapter V can be extended to multi-period
and system-wide resource allocation decision models that include inspection policies.
This problem becomes especially challenging in multi-period planning with varying
level of resources at each period.
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APPENDIX A
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Table XIII. Transitional probabilities for Min, Mid and Max actions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.000 0.973 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.172 0.801 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.526 0.430 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.169 0.552 0.249 0.026 0.001
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.050 0.331 0.428 0.163
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.216 0.494 0.240 0.036
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.216 0.494 0.240 0.036
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.216 0.494 0.240 0.036
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.216 0.494 0.240 0.036
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.216 0.494 0.240 0.036
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.160 0.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.160 0.839 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.810 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.732 0.107 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.159 0.636 0.195 0.009 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.192 0.638 0.164 0.006 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.590 0.302 0.023 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.458 0.445 0.062 0.002 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.305 0.540 0.136 0.008 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.177 0.554 0.241 0.024 0.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.126 0.874 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.958 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.126 0.872 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.751 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.832 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.572 0.416 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.735 0.136 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.454 0.494 0.041 0.001 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.625 0.235 0.013 0.000 0.000
107
VITA
Reza Seyedolshohadaie received his Bachelor of Science degree in industrial en-
gineering from Iran University of Science and Technology in 2000. After working for
two years in industry, he started his graduate studies at Prairie View A&M University
and earned his Master of Science degree in computer information systems in Decem-
ber 2004. He entered the Ph.D. program in industrial and systems engineering at
Texas A&M University in 2005 and received his doctoral degree in August 2011. His
research interests include decision-making under uncertainty and risk management
with application in infrastructure asset management.
Reza Seyedolshohadaie may be reached at Department of Industrial and Systems
Engineering, Engineering Technologies Building, 3131 TAMU, College Station, TX
77843-3131. His email address is reza.seyed@gmail.com.
The typist for this dissertation was S. Reza Seyedolshohadaie.
